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Abstract
This thesis explores the concept of Officers ofParliament and their place in the much
older concept of responsible government. It argues that the changing nature of
responsible government allows a place for Officers of Parliament to assist Parliament
in holding government accountable. Since Officers ofParliament act as a check on
government, it is necessary for the Officers to be independent from government.
This thesis argues that independence is one of the defining characteristics of the
Officers. Finally, by examining the relationship of Officers ofParliament with both
the Senate and the House of Commons it is possible to see how Officers of
Parliament fit into the complex structure ofparliamentary government. This
examination illustrates how the Houses ofParliament relate to their Officers as well
as to each other.
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Introduetion
The Auditor General (1878), the Chief Electoral Officer (1920), the
Commissioner of Official Languages (1969) and the Information and Privacy
Commissioners (1982) are Canada's Officers of Parliament. According to Senator
Michael Pitfield, Officers of Parliament are ''the direct and immediate servant[s] of
Parliament itself:"1 One way this is represented is by the reporting of these Officers
directly to Parliament through the Speaker of the House of Commons, and in the case
of the three commissioners, through the Speakers of the House of Commons and of
the Senate. There is no single term that defines an Officer of Parliament; however,
one of the most important criteria to an Officer of Parliament is independence. In
order to be seen as Parliament's servants these Officers must have, and be perceived
to have, a significant degree of independence from the government of the day. This
independence is acquired through reporting and removal procedures, the guarantee of
financial independence, tenure, and the Officer's general control over the operations
of the office.
While there may be some confusion as to who is and who is not an Officer of
Parliament, this thesis will deal only with the Auditor General, the Chief Electoral
Officer, and the Commissioners of Language, Information and Privacy. Other "near
officers," such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Public Service
Commission, will not be examined. Furthermore, Officers of Parliament should not
be confused with the Clerk of either House, the Sergeant-At-Arms, the Parliamentary
Counsel and the like. Senator Pitfield explains that these
Canada, Senate, Debates 27 June 1990,2199.
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positions are known as "officers of the House," but at the same time they are "the
nominations of the government and serve Parliament.,,2
Although Officers of Parliament playa central role in Canadian government,
as a group these positions have largely gone unstudied. While some articles and a
few books examine individual Officers, mainly the Auditor General, few of these
sources attempt to discuss the contribution ofOfficers ofParliament as a collective to
the Canadian parliamentary system. This contribution at its most basic level is to
serve as a check on government accountability. The lack of scholarly attention to
Officers of Parliament is surprising since in modem Canadian government and
politics the general concern about the restraint of executive power grows in
importance. For a demonstration of the truth of this assertion, one may tum to the
debate over the position of the Ethics Counsellor who, as of June 2002, is not an
Officer ofParliament.3
Despite the role Officers of Parliament play in holding the government
accountable, these Officers are a contradiction to the very principle on which
Canadian government is based. The foundation of the Canadian parliamentary
system is responsible government, a theory that dictates that the executive is directly
responsible to Parliament. It is through Parliament that government is to be held
accountable and responsible to the people. By this description, there is no room for
other agents of accountability. Officers of Parliament represent some of the changes
that that have occurred in the Canadian system of government and the way that
2 Ibid.
3 For example see Andrew McIntos~ "Counsellor powerless in the eyes ofcritics," National
Post. 20 November 2000, A7; Joel-Denis Bellavances "Liberals Defeat Their Own Policy," National
Post 14 February 2001, AI; Andrew McIntos~ "Guide to Chretien's 8-point reform plan," National
Post 24 May 2002, A7.
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governments have chosen to adapt to these changes; however, an explanation for the
place of Officers of Parliament in the Canadian system still needs to be provided.
Chapter One explores the difference between the theory of responsible
government and its perception and application to the Canadian parliamentary system.
The chapter argues that responsible government can no longer function according to
a theory that dictates that the executive is directly responsible to Parliament. Rather,
responsible government has come to mean, at least in colloquial usage, that the
government is responsible to the people, not to Parliament. Due to the growth in
government and the bureaucracy, members of Parliament and political parties are no
longer seen as effective representatives of the people. As such, governments have
been forced to implement other means to ensure that governments are both
responsible and responsive. Officers of Parliament are one mechanism governments
have used to adapt to the changing ideas and expectations ofresponsible government.
As government in Canada has evolved, the ideas associated with responsible
government have changed. As a result, the government has been forced to respond
to these changes by making itself more accountable to the Canadian people whose
distrust of government is increasing. One way for the government to present itself as
more dependable and trustworthy is to have itself evaluated by an independent body -
in this case Officers of Parliament. Like Parliament itself, its Officers help ensure
the accountability of government. The importance of Officers of Parliament is
demonstrated by what members of Parliament have to say about them. Consider, for
instance, the remark by Yvon Pinard, speaking from the Government side of the
House: "[the Auditor General's] office plays a role without which it would be
difficult for us to assume our own responsibilities to the Canadian people. The
Auditor General is one of the main protectors of public interest." More relevant to
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this thesis, he maintains that "the Office of the Auditor General plays a major role in
the assurance of responsible government within a parliamentary democracy.',4
Chapter Two looks more closely at how Officers of Parliament operate. Its
thesis is that the cardinal features of Officers of Parliament are independence and
accountability. Perhaps the most important feature of these Officers is independence
from the executive. It is this independence that guarantees their detachment from the
executive and in tum assures the impartial evaluation of government. It is the
objective investigation of government, as discussed in chapter one, that carves a
place for Officers of Parliament in responsible government. Audits of government in
the areas of financial management, electoral legislation, equality of the French and
English languages, the access to government information and the protection of
personal privacy help to guarantee the responsible nature ofgovernment.
The principle of accountability is equally important and should be interpreted
in two ways. First, Officers of Parliament are not all-powerful. They are held
accountable by Parliament, a fact that illustrates their detachment from the executive.
Although it is argued that the executive controls Parliament, the intentional
separation of Officers of Parliament from the executive is symbolic. It illustrates that
there is a demand for Officers of Parliament to be independent from government.
Although the independence of Officers of Parliament may only exist in theory, it is
the attempt to remove the Officers from the reach of the executive that is important.
Second, Officers of Parliament help make responsible government more accountable
and responsible to the public. The accountability Officers of Parliament offer to
government arises from the trust gained from the Officers' independence.
4 Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 10 April 1981, 9160.
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Chapter Three examines the operation of the Officers in their relationship to a
bicameral Parliament. This is important because it explores the interaction between
Parliament and its Officers. By examining the relationship between the House of
Commons and Officers ofParliament and the Senate and Officers of Parliament, it is
possible to see how these Officers fit into the complex structure of parliamentary
government. This examination illustrates not only how the Houses of Parliament
adapt to the activities of Officers of Parliament but also how the Houses of
Parliament adapt to each other.
Officers of Parliament have been a largely ignored feature of responsible
government in Canada. This thesis will show the central role Officers of Parliament
play in responsible government, a role too long overlooked since it is these Officers
who help governments be responsible. The significance of Officers of Parliament is
revealed by the high opinion members of Parliament hold of them, as witness the
following comment by an Opposition member of Parliament (Mr. C.A. Gauthier):
"I have always considered that the Auditor General is above all political
considerations or all governments. He has always seemed to me like the compass
guiding the federal vessel, regardless ofwho is the captain.,,5
s Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 21 April 1970, 6117.
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Chapter One: Responsible Government and Officers of Parliament
Canada's frrst Officer of Parliament, the Auditor General, was appointed in
18781• Since then, four other officers have been created: the Chief Electoral Officer
(1920), the Commissioner of Official Languages (1969), and the Information and
Privacy Commissioners (1982). The peculiar nature of these creatures of Parliament
makes them difficult to categorize and has left them largely undefined.2 Moreover,
their characteristics and tenns of office differ from one to the other. There is no base
for a unified concept that will pennit an explanation of their function, roles and
responsibilities.
At their most basic, Officers of Parliament are seen to be a type of check on
government, or at least a measure to enforce government accountability. The
Auditor General, for example, holds government financially accountable. Through
independent audits and examinations, the Auditor General provides what is perceived
to be objective information and advice, and thus assurance to Parliament about the
financial practices of government.3 The Information Commissioner and the Privacy
Commissioner check the government's use of infonnation. The former ensures the
government's compliance with the Access to Information Act (R.S. 1985, c. A-I).
I See appendix A for a list ofthe terms ofOfficers ofParliament.
2 See for example the Report of the Special Committee on the Modernization and
Improvement ofthe Procedures ofthe House ofCommons. 37th Parliament, 1st Session,
Http://w\vw.parl.gc.ca/infoComDoc/37/I/SMIP/Studies/Reports/SMIP-e.htm
(Retrieved 9 June, 2001), Section 42. This report lists the Officers named above, the Clerk ofthe
House ofCommons, the Parliamentary Librarian, and the "Ethics Counsellor with respect to the
Lobbyists Registration Ac(' as Officers ofParliament. See also the Report ofthe Special Committee
on Reform ofthe House ofCommons (Ottawa: Minister ofSupply and Services, 1985),33. In
addition to the Officers this thesis examines, this report includes the Human Rights Commissioner, the
Parliamentary Librarian and the Associate Parliamentary Librarian as "House ofCommons Officers."
3 Office ofthe Auditor General, "Our Mission" www.oag-bvg.gc.~J! Retrieved 23 November
2001.
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For instance, citizens denied infonnation by the government have the right to
complain to the Information Commissioner who is duty-bound to investigate the
claim. The latter, the Privacy Commissioner, monitors the use of infonnation in
government files.
The Chief Electoral Officer and Commissioner of Official Languages
provide a different sort of check on government. The Chief Electoral Officer
oversees Canada's elections and assumes responsibility for their fair and democratic
execution. The Commissioner of Official Languages monitors the use of Canada's
official languages, French and English. This Officer checks government's language
policy and makes certain that both French and English are respected in government,
the federal public service and other areas that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal
government.
The curious point about this diverse group is that they appear to contradict the
concept on which Canadian parliamentary government is based, that is the executive
dominance of the legislature. The most obvious contradiction is that since Officers
of Parliament do not report through a minister it appears that they are able to sidestep
the apparatus of responsible government. Thus, there is a tension between the theory
of responsible government and Officers of Parliament. If the executive is responsible
to the House of Commons, where then do unelected, appointed Officers, who may be
removed in most instances by the House of Commons and the Senate, and who are
expected to audit government, fit into a system of responsible government?
To answer this question it is necessary to examine what is responsible
government. Examination of this principle will reveal that there is a difference
between the theory and the practice of responsible government in Canada. As a
7
4result, adaptations have been made to the theory of responsible government, and
these, in turn, have shaped parliamentary government in Canada in a distinctive way.
Essentially, responsible government "makes the executive accountable to the
House of Commons.',4 It is through accountability to the elected legislature that the
government remains indirectly accountable to the people.5 One must remember that
the powers in Canada's Parliament are fused; contrary to language often heard in the
media there is no separation of the executive from Parliament. Canada's "system of
government is not compartmentalized as between the government and Parliament.
The political executive is composed of Members of Parliament and is therefore not
separate from Parliament.,,6 Eugene Forsey claimed that "in the classic theory,
Parliament exists to transact public business: to legislate, to criticize the Government,
to support or condemn the government as it thinks fit, to turn out one Government
and put in another, without an election.,,7
Responsible government dictates that the Crown will appoint ministers who
hold the confidence of the House of Commons. This ensures that ministers are
available to the House of Commons. Another indication of this point is the practice
of not appointing Senators to the Cabinet, although it has occurred. The executive is
composed of individuals who are usually Members of Parliament. The Crown acts
on advice of the ministers, who are expected to be collectively responsible for policy
decisions to the House. As such, if a minister loses the confidence of the House, his
Patrick Macolmson and Richard Myers, The Canadian Regime (Peterborough: Broadview
Press, 1996), 60.
S Jennifer Smith, "Democracy and the Canadian House ofCommons at the millennium,"
Canadian Public Administration 42 (1999), 406.
6 Privy Council Office, Responsibility in the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister ofSupply and
Services, 1993),38.
7 Eugene Forsey, "What is Parliamentary Responsible Government?" in The King Byng
Affair. 1926: A Ouestion ofResponsible Government. ed. Roger Graham (Toronto: CoppClark,
1967), 119.
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or her resignation is expected; if a government loses the confidence of the House,
dissolution of Parliament may be the result.8
The implementation of responsible government in Canada was intended to
stop warring in the legislature between the governor's supporters and his opponents
and to make the executive accountable to the legislature for policy, patronage and
departmental administration and, most importantly, to provide for a "constitutional
opposition.,,9 This constitutional opposition would be "a focused opposition that
would watch and control the government, remind it of the alternative points of view
in the electorate, perhaps occasionally aid it, but certainly be unable to prevent it
from prosecuting the public business with vigour and energy."IO In more recent
years there has been much talk about the opposition in Canada. Often the focus of
the discussion is on the weakness of Canada's opposition parties. Increased interest
in Officers of Parliament may in part be explained by weak opposition parties. In
fact, it is suggested that Officers of Parliament assist the opposition. Senator
Michael Pitfield explains that Officers of Parliament "do the members' work, and
they are armed with special powers for that purpose-powers that members do not
have individually, powers of a scope or kind that they should be exercised only in the
name of Parliament as a whole."ll Officers of Parliament are " the officers of all
members, particularly opposition members.,,12
8 Malcolmson and Myers, 60-61. Malcolmson and Myers explain that "when the House
expresses a lack ofconfidence in a ministry (either by adopting an explicit motion ofnon-confidence
or by voting down a proposal that the ministry deems a matter ofconfidence), responsible government
has in a sense broken down because the executive is no longer acting in a manner that reflects the
wishes ofa majority ofthe people's representatives. In order to keep responsible government going,
then, either the ministry or the House must be replaced."
9 Jennifer Smith, "Responsible Government and Democracy," in Taking Stock of 150 Years of
Responsible Government in Canada. eds. F. Leslie Seidle and Louis Massicotte (Ottawa: Canadian
Study ofParliament Group, 1998),24.
10 Ibid.
11 Canada, Senate, Debates, 27 June 1990,2200.
12 Ibid.
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To fully understand responsible government, it is important to be familiar
with the word responsible. In this instance, responsible has three meanings. First,
ministers and cabinet have been granted power to advise the Crown and are
responsible for the use of this power. As well, Ministers are responsible for the
administration of their departments and must be held accountable for the actions of
the their department. Thus, collectively, cabinet and government are responsible for
the general management of government. Second, government is expected to be a
responsible "steward of the nation's affairs." In this sense, responsibility is to
represent the balancing act governments must do in order to respond to the national
interest in the development of policy. The third meaning of responsible is that
ministers are not only "responsible for the use of these powers, but are also
responsible and accountable to parliament." Therefore, cabinet and government are
responsible to a body ofelected members who represent the people. i3
Ministerial responsibility is one of the key components of the concept of
responsible government because it provides for accountability throughout the
system.14 The use "of these powers, for which ministers are constitutionally
responsible to Parliament, provides the foundation of responsible government.,,15
This includes the two central ideas of legal and political responsibility. This means
that the minister is responsible for all acts of the Crown under the minister's
supervision. Political responsibility refers to the principle that "the minister is the
sole representative to the House and the focus in the House for those seeking answers
and redress."16
13 C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament ofCanada (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1987), lO-
ll. Emphasis in original.
14 Privy Council Office, 4.
IS Ibid.
16 S.L. Sutherland, "Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every Reform Is
Its Own Problem," Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science 24 (1991), 96. Emphasis in original.
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Furthennore, collective responsibility of ministers is imperative to "providing
the stability and unity essential to the conduct of ministerial government.,,17 The
majority party's claim to fonn a government is protected by collective responsibility
in two ways. First, collective responsibility protects a minister who is under attack.
Second, it reinforces the prime minister by "inviting dissident ministers to accept a
policy or leave.,,18 The rules of the doctrine of collective responsibility ensure ''that
the Government should stand or fall as one 'administration;' . . . that the
administration speaks fonnally to Parliament with one voice, and that ministers
collectively resign or the Government asks for dissolution if defeated in the
Commons on a matter ofconfidence.,,19
While responsible government is the theory on which the Canadian
parliamentary system is based, "Canadians seem particularly willing to accept that
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility has mostly outlived its applicability to
modem political life.,,20 In short, there are a number of problems with the operation
of this theory. First, some critics suggest that because of the growth of bureaucracy
it is no longer possible for ministers to have control over all the intricate details of
their departments.21 Others, such as Sharon Sutherland, argue that ministers were
never really aware of every detail in their department, and although the theory of
responsible government, it is thought, may demand the resignation of a minister who
finds himself or herself in the middle of a departmental disaster, such has rarely
occurred.22 Convention notwithstanding, responsible government does not lead to a
17 Privy Council Office, 4.
18 Sutherland, 95.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 91.
21 Rejean Pelletier, "Responsible Government: Victory or Defeat for Parliament?" in Taking
Stock of 150 Years ofResponsible Government in Canada. eds. F. Leslie SeidJe and Louis Massicotte
(Ottawa: Canadian Study ofParliament Group, 1998),52-53.
22 Sutherland, 100-105.
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responsive government.23 Consequently, the line of accountability often becomes
blurred and difficult to follow, in large part because the growth in government has
"brought with it the need to grant increasing powers of discretion to the executive
side of government.,,24
It is important to remember that responsive government is the desired result
of responsible government. In fact, "the central feature of individual ministerial
responsibility for administration is that [it] offers a timeless focal point for legal,
political and administrative responsiveness.,,2s In the past, governments were
perceived to be responsive because it was thought that they were answerable to the
people through Parliament. Due to the distorted line of accountability and the
misconception of how responsible government is supposed to work, people no longer
see the benefit ofbeing represented by their member of Parliament. The introduction
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has encouraged the recognition of
various organisations representing women, Aboriginal peoples, and others, which has
led to different beliefs about the way government handles the affairs of citizens. As
a result, the traditional theory of responsible government is increasingly called into
question.26
Traditionally, political parties filled the representation void; however, "a
number of factors associated with the growth of government and the operation of
modem political parties make it increasingly difficult to meet [the] ... requirements
23 Peter Aucoin, "Responsible Government and Citizen Engagement at the Millennium: Are
Political Parties Irrelevant?" in Taking Stock of 150 Years ofResponsible Government inC~
eds. F. Leslie Seidle and Louis Massicotte, (Ottawa: Canadian Study ofParliament Group, 1998), 76.
24 Donald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman Plan: The Worldwide Spread ofan Idea, Revised 2nd ed.
(New York: University Press ofAmerica, 1985),49.
2S Sutherland, 99. Emphasis in original.
26 Lisa Young, "Value Clash: Parliament and Citizens after 150 Years ofResponsible
Government" in Taking Stock of 150 Years ofResponsible Government in Canada, eds. F. Leslie
Seidle and Louis Massicotte (Ottawa: Canadian Study ofParliament Group, 1998), 105.
11
of responsible government.,,27 When responsible government was introduced in the
Canadas and Nova Scotia in 1848, the main societal division was religious. As
ethnic, linguistic, regional and gender differences grew political parties attempted to
diffuse these tensions as well. Whether or not they were actually successful in
accommodating interests is debatable, but their perceived success is what is
important. To those for whom these cleavages are important, it appears that parties
have not been successful in ensuring the representation of their interests in
Parliament. As a result, Parliament has been criticized for being "unrepresentative"
and "unresponsive." At root, the criticism is that when parties fail to represent their
constituents, government ceases to be representative, and consequently, responsible
to the people.28
One consequence of this is that responsible government, at least in practice, is
beginning to change. For example, governments will have to fmd alternative
methods to ensure control and accountability in their departments. This point is
significant because it carves out a functional role for Officers of Parliament within
the Canadian parliamentary system. Whatever the state of the theory of responsible
government, the practice has changed.
One could argue that it has been a series of failures of responsible
government that has led to the use of Officers of Parliament. The creation of an
independent Auditor General followed nearly a decade of "what must be one of the
most preposterous series of incidents in the history of responsible government.,,29
An independent Chief Electoral Officer was established in response to the "chaotic"
27 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada Volume
Three (Ottawa: Minister ofSupply and Services Canada, 1985), 36.
28 Young, 115.
29 Norman Ward, The Public Purse: A Study in Canadian Democraqy (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1962),64. For a description ofthe "preposterous series of incidents", see this work,
62-67.
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and "inefficient" execution ofelections, which were run by the Clerk of the Crown in
Chancery.30 In the case of the Official Languages Commissioner, the Commissioner
was appointed because the government had failed to adequately protect the language
rights of French and English Canadians. It could be argued that the development of
the Commissioners of Information and Privacy arose out of the desire to protect the
information and privacy rights of Canadians before the government failed to do so.
The debate around privacy "came to the political agenda in Canada in the 1960s and
1970s as a result of the computerization of personal information systems (especially
in the public sector) together with the development of a universal identifier (the
Social Insurance Number). No notable crisis precipitated anxiety over privacy, as
happened in other countries.,,31 Information legislation emerged in the later 1960s
and early 1970s32 and was influenced by the legislation of other countries,
particularly the United States, a country that at the time was plagued by accusations
that government was too secretive.33
Another problem with responsible government is that it is frequently
misunderstood. For example, the House of Commons Procedure and Practice states
that
responsible government has long been considered an
essential element of government based on the Westminster
model. Despite its wide acceptance as a cornerstone of the
Canadian system of government there are different meanings
attached to the term 'responsible government.' In a general
sense, responsible government means that a government
30 J.R. Mallory, The Structure ofCanadian Government (Calgary: Gage Publishing Limited),
183-184.
31 Colin J. Bennett, "The Office ofthe Privacy Commissioner ofCanada: Regulator, Educator,
Consultant and Judge," paper prepared for the conference "Independence and Responsibility: A
Conference on the Officers ofParliament" in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan November 2nd and 3nl, 2001.
Book forthcoming.
32 Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General on the Review ofthe
Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, Open and Shut: Enhancing the Right to Know and the
Right to Privacy (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1987), 2.
33 Information Commissioner ofCanada, The Access to Information Act: 10 Years On (Ottawa:
Minister ofPublic Works and Government Services, 1994),2.
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must be responsible to its citizens, that it must operate
responsibly ... and that its Ministers must be accountable or
responsible to Parliament.34
This description is noteworthy because it suggests that responsible
government means responsible to the people, which is not exactly correct, at least not
in the traditional British Parliamentary sense. This later understanding has
considerable significance for Officers of Parliament because it gives them a new
function in Canadian government- to hold government accountable not on behalf of
Parliament but on behalfofCanadian citizens.
It is no exaggeration to say that Canadians are unclear about the definition of
responsible government. This generalization includes some members of Parliament
and, in particular, members of the Reform Party. Along with their promotion of
direct democracy, the Reform Party has actively campaigned for changes in the
House of Commons. One object of their crusade was free votes in the House, a goal
that demonstrated their disdain for party discipline. More than this, it shows that
they did not understand the principles and theory behind responsible government.35
If members of Parliament do not understand the merits of responsible
government, it is not surprising they are misunderstood by the general public. Many
Canadians blame components of responsible government, such as party discipline,
for the unresponsiveness ofgovernment. It seems that the general public lacks a full
understanding of what responsible government is designed to do. Most people
believe that responsible government means that government is directly responsible to
34 Robert Marleau and Camile Montpetit (eds), House ofCommons Procedure and Practice
(Ottawa: House ofCommons, 2000), 28.
35 Smith, "Democracy and the Canadian House ofCommons at the millennium," 401.
Professor Smith holds "radical reformers argue that party discipline is undemocratic because it
prevents members from giving voice and vote to the preferences oftheir constituents. Well, viewed
in isolation, party discipline does sound undemocratic. However, it cannot be viewed in isolation but
instead must be viewed in relation to the parliamentary structure ofgovernment versus opposition ...
party discipline has to be considered as a component ofa system that delivers on the democratic
principle in aparticular way." Emphasis in original, 417.
1~
the people, rather than to the people through an elected body. Just as there is a
difference between the provisions of government and "the actual conduct of
government,,,36 there is a large gap between the theory of responsible government
and the understanding ofresponsible government.
Part of the reason for the ambiguity about responsible government lies in its
foundation- it was not constitutionally entrenched but rather is deeply embedded in
conventions. Conventions change and so, too, does responsible government. Nearly
a quarter of a century ago, the Royal Commission on Financial Management and
Accountability (Lambert Commission) addressed this. It declared that ''the
principles of responsible government, while still generally accepted, are in danger of
becoming irrelevant to the actual situation.,,3?
Paul Thomas states that currently under responsible government, "it is the
principal task ofthe legislature to compel the executive to boast and confess about its
activities in public before a politically sophisticated and often critical audience as a
method of generating wider understanding and support for government activities.,,38
This statement implies that there are other methods that would assist Parliament in
drawing attention to important issues. These other instruments may be Officers of
Parliament, or at least, this may be one of their roles.
Since Officers of Parliament do not report through a minister, they are often
seen as a contradiction to responsible government. Rather than look at Officers of
Parliament as mechanisms that contradict responsible government (since they are
independent of the executive), they can be viewed as a tool that helps governments
36 David E. Smith, The Inyisible Crown: the First Principle ofCanadian Government (Toronto:
University ofToronto, 1995), 95.
37 The ROYal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability Final RejK>rt (Ottawa:
Minister ofSupply and Services, 1979),370.
38 Paul G. Thomas, "The Lambert Report: Parliament and Accountability," Canadian Public
Administration 22 (1979), 557.
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be responsible. Parliament plays a significant role in holding the government
accountable.39 If one of their jobs is to seek to hold government accountable, then an
argument could be made that these Officers are actually an extension of Parliament
(albeit as immune as a federal judge to Parliament's wishes). As such, they have
become a part of responsible government in Canada. In 1947, Liberal government
member James Sinclair stated: "Certainly the development of the position of the
auditor general has gone step by step with the development of responsible
government in Canada.,,40
The Lambert Commission (1979) attributed three tasks to Parliament: "to
legislate, to grant supply and authorize the levying of taxes, and, ultimately, to
support or replace the MiniStry.,,41 The responsibility to govern does not rest with
Parliament. Parliament's role, "which is of no less importance, is the continuous
scrutiny that it is empowered to maintain over the Government's implementation of
the measures to which Parliament has given assent.,,42 The scrutiny ofParliament
involves more than discussion and approval of legislation; it
should encompass the review of public administration in the
full sense of examining priorities, plans and their
implementation. In other words, it should deal not only with
the policies of government, but also with the efficiency and
effectiveness with which programs are carried out to
implement those policies.43
It is in this respect -and not as a literal part of Parliament- that Officers of Parliament
are an extension of Parliament's work. Officers of Parliament scrutinize the
government in the areas of finance, language, information and privacy. Moreover,
Officers of Parliament are expected to evaluate the effectiveness of government
programs and ensure that programs meet the intentions ofParliament.
39
40
41
42
43
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Deyelopment Prospects for Canada. 37.
Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 31 March 1947, 190I.
The Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability. 370.
Ibid.
Ibid., 372.
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The Officers of Parliament themselves appear to view their work as an
extension of Parliament's work. In his 1992-1993 Annual Report, then Privacy
Commissioner Bruce Phillips (1991-2000) said that part of the mission ofthe Privacy
Commissioner was ''to be Parliament's window on privacy issues, arming it with
facts needed to make informed judgements through research and communications.',44
In his 1997 Annual Report, Phillips noted the impact of technology on personal
privacy, and the role the Office of the Privacy Commissioner played in policy
analysis and research that was "so essential to keeping Parliament and the public
abreast of important information.,,45
The Lambert Commission goes as far as to say that Parliament has failed to
"legitimize" government because of the failure of Parliament to "undertake an open
and comprehensible review of government expenditure and a comparison of results
against stated goals.',46 The Commission continues claiming, ''this failure on the part
of Parliament to 'legitimize' government exacts a price in public trust.,,47 This is
supported by evidence that suggests that the majority of Canadians feel that their
system of government is corrupt.48 Confidence is renewed in government when an
independent authority is appointed to watch over government policies. Regarding
Canada's Anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-36, the Senate Committee reviewing the
bill recommended an Officer of Parliament to oversee the legislation. Officers of
Parliament create trust because of their independence of government.49 New
Democmtic Party member Bev Desjarlais proclaims that "in spite of Canadians not
44 . Privacy Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Report 1992-1993 (Ottawa: Canada
Commwtication Group, 1993), v.
45 Privacy Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Report 1997-1998 (Ottawa: Minister ofSupply
and Services, 1998), 8.
46 Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, 372.
47 Ibid.
48 Jane Taber, "PM instructs MPs to tell nations 'we're honest'," National Post 25 April 2002,
At.
49 Hugh Winsor, "Ramming terror bill into law could backfire," Globe and Mail, 29 November
2001, A14.
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having faith in our democratic system, politicians, the government and specifically
the Prime Minister ... I would wager a fair chunk that they have faith in the Auditor
General ... and in the position that he holds.,,50
It is not unusual for governments to turn to other avenues in order to help
relieve members of Parliament of their heavy workload, to let citizens to have their
say and to present, at least in appearance, a more responsible, representative and
accountable government. Governments have used a number of different resources to
ensure accountability and responsibility. Regulatory agencies and royal
so
commissions are two examples. However, it is possible to include Officers of
Parliament in this category. Although each of the above mechanisms functions in a
different way, one of their goals, as with Officers of Parliament, is to ensure the
responsiveness of government.
Regulatory agencies can be independent from government and have a number
of different functions. Relative to this discussion, these agencies exist to research
and provide information on policies, as well as to offer advice to government. In
addition, they remove an issue from the political realm. They are another way for
governments to deal with problems that arise in a way that appears accountable to the
public.
Canadian governments also utilise royal commissions. Since Confederation,
there have been more than 400 federal commissions of inquiry which are generally
assumed to have had the powers of a royal commission.51 Royal commissions are
"ad hoc bodies, authorized by the government and tasked with the responsibility of
Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 5 April 2001.
htt[2;//www.parI~~a/37.LJ/parfult?Lchambus/debqtes/Q44-20(U-O{-O~bmlQ04=JJOQ.::e.h!!TI
Retrieved 30 April 2002.
Sl James Murray Whalen, Records ofFederal Royal Commissions Volume 1, Government
Archives Division, General Inventory Series, (Ottawa: National Archives ofCanada, 1990), ix.
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either investigating an incident, an issue or a policy matter."S2 Royal commissions
illustrate the willingness of the government to remove an issue from politics, and are
just one method governments use for the analysis of policy. These independent
bodies free busy members of Parliament, who "lack expertise and are too dedicated
either to pleasing their party or their constituency," and allow for impartial
examination ofthe issue.53
In Great Britain, the solution to the problem of an unresponsive government
seems to closely match the role of Officers of Parliament. The following quotation
outlines the need for responsibility and an instrument that is able to tame
governments. It calls for a tool of democratic accountability that has a place within
Parliament.
The need, then, is for a contemporary theory and practice of
responsibility. It is too important simply to be entrusted to
the fictions of an inherited constitutional doctrine ... the
extended state of big government and quasi-government ...
with its intimate connections with the nexus of private
governments, demands an equally extensive network of
democratic accountability. This needs to be as varied,
complex and extensive as government itself. It should
supplement and nourish the political responsibility of
adversarial party politics. It cannot be confined to
Parliament; but Parliament can put it in place and watch over
't S41 •
Like royal commissions, the five Officers of Parliament provide objective and
independent advice to government. Each is required to investigate, study and
recommend to government, in order to increase accountability and responsiveness in
situations that are highly contentious such as financial management and
accountability, language or election administration. Each of these topics has been
52 Barry S. Harrison, "Canadian Royal Commissions of Inquiry," Prepared for presentation at
the ACSUS Biennial Conference, November 17-21, 1999,6.
53 Ibid., 9.
54 Tony Wright, Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on British Politics (New York: Routeldge,
1994),49.
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reviewed by a royal commission and is currently overseen by an Officer of
Parliament.
Parliamentary government in Canada has been
a process of narrowing the exercise of the prerogative
authority by subjecting it increasingly to the pre-eminence of
the statutory authority, substituting the authority of the
Crown in Parliament for the Crown alone. This process may
aptly be characterized as having made the Crown responsible
to Parliament for the exercise of its power. The Crown
continues to exercise the legislativerwer, but it can only do
so with the approval ofParliament.S
This is the principle of responsible government. The Crown exercises power
only with the approval of Parliament. This idea leaves little room to explain the
function of the extra-Parliament forces such as Officers of Parliament. The use of
these additional instruments illustrates that adaptation of the system was needed.
Due to a number of changes, and an unclear understanding of responsible
government, Canadians felt that their government was no longer responsible.
Because of this, governments were forced to create different devices to appease the
electorate and 'boast' responsive, responsible, accountable government. Officers of
Parliament help them do this by functioning as an independent arm ofParliament that
investigates, researches and recommends to the government on Parliament's behalf.
While the Auditor General and Chief Electoral Officer were created long before the
societal changes discussed above or before "post-modern" attitudes to responsible
government, their role as Officers of Parliament has increasingly come to include
holding government responsible.
Officers of Parliament serve both government and Parliament. These
Officers remove some of the workload and expectations of Parliament. By promoting
themselves as Officers of Parliament, their recommendations and reports are viewed
55 Privy Council Office, 11.
differently than a report coming from the government side. Parliament is assisted in
its research function and is able to claim that it more effectively holds government to
account. Government benefits from Officers of Parliament because it is able to
appear more accountable and responsive to the electorate. Through the annual
reports of the Officers, Parliament and government are able to assess the
performance of government in the areas of financial management, elections,
language policy, information availability and protection of personal privacy. From
here, the government is able to claim accountability since it is examined on a regular
basis and "accountability depends upon systematic means of assessing
performance."S6
Officers of Parliament fit into the changing needs and ideas of what
responsible government is. While the convention of responsible government states
"that the executive is answerable to Parliament, the reality is that the Canadian
electorate will no longer accept that defInition. Canada's disgruntled electorate
demands that government is more accountable and responsive and Officers of
Parliament assist government with this goal. The Auditor General can be used as
the representative Officer of Parliament. In the words of Robert Stanfield, Leader of
the Opposition in the House of Commons (1967-1976): "From time to time, certain
reports of the Auditor General are annoYing, but there is no question about it, they
make for better government."S7
56
57
Privy Council Office, 93.
Canada, House ofCommons, Debates. 21 April 1970, 6113.
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Chapter Two: Independence and Accountability
Two key factors relating to properly conceived Officers of Parliament are
independence and accountability. It is in part from the idea of independence that
Officers of Parliament are defined. Often the Officers invoke this feature in order to
distinguish themselves from other instruments of government and Parliament.1
While independence of the Officers is necessary, according to Canada's Chief
Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley, "independence, as a virtue, does not travel
alone. It must be seen in the constant company of accountability.,,2 Independence
and accountability are crucial attributes because they confer on Officers of
Parliament trust and legitimacy. Public trust arises when Officers of Parliament are
seen to be independent from government; legitimacy arises when they are held
accountable to Parliament.
The themes of independence and accountability will be the subject of this
chapter. First, the concept of independence and its relation to Officers of Parliament
will be discussed. This will include an evaluation of the independence of Officers of
Parliament, realizing that this evaluation is challenged by the fact that each Officer of
Parliament differs from the others. Second, the way in which Officers of Parliament
are held accountable will be examined.
See for example, Office ofthe Auditor General ofCanada, 2001-02 Estimates: A Report on
Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Minister ofPublic Works and Government Services, 2001), 6; Canada,
Senate, Proceedings ofthe Standing COmmittee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 18 June 1998,
number 30, 30-8.
2 Jean-Pierre Kingsley, "Independence and Accountability Mechanisms in Federal Electoral
Legislation," Office ofthe Chief Electoral Officers. Received through personal e-mail.Friday 15
March 2002.
2.1 Independence
The value of independence to an Officer of Parliament is illustrated in a
discussion surrounding the creation of the Office of Chief Electoral Officer in 1920.
One of Canada's politicians of the day, government member Hugh Guthrie, stated,
"if we accept the principle that there must be a Chief Electoral Officer, that man
must be independent of the Government of the day, and he must be placed in such a
position as to make him independent ofany Government or party.,,3
An illustration from a later date demonstrates why independence from the
government is necessary for Officers of Parliament. In this instance, the government
was that of Quebec and the office the provincial Ombudsman. The issue concerned
social initiatives of the Lucien Bouchard government which the Ombudsman, Daniel
Jacoby, criticized.4 When later Mr. Jacoby's second five-year mandate ended in
August 1997, he was neither replaced nor his term renewed since the two-thirds vote
of the National Assembly needed for approval could not be reached. The
Ombudsman found his budget frozen and his credibility attacked by government.5 It
was reasonable to conclude that Mr. Jacoby was being punished for his criticisms of
the Bouchard government. This suggests that formal independence of the official
from the government was not sufficient, as in this instance the government was able
to freeze his budget.
Canada, House ofCommons, Debates, 26 June 1920, 4266. It is worth noting that Guthrie
was part ofthe Union government and therefore was familiar with the controversy surrounding the
wartime election of 1917 when the War Time Elections Act and the Military Voters Act were passed,
which may have affected his beliefs surrounding an independent ChiefElectoral Officer. According
to R. MacGregor Dawson, "The general purposes ofthese acts were plain and unmistakable: they
were to give the vote to those who would support the government, to take it away from those who
would oppose it, and to create a floating military vote, a large part ofwhich would almost certainly be
given to government candidates." R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government ofCanada. 5th ed.,
revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1970),321-322.
4 Rheal Seguin, ··Premier seeks ·lap dog,' says Quebec Ombudsman," Globe and Mail, 14
December 2000, A6.
S Ibid.
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According to a Senate Committee, independence is important because it
creates public trust. The debate surrounding Canada's Anti-terrorism legislation, Bill
C-36 indicates this. The Senate Committee that reviewed the bill recommended an
Officer of Parliament be designated to oversee its implementation since "the key to
creating public confidence . . . lies in an independent authority to ensure that its
implementation reflects its intent.,,6 Appointing someone as an Officer of Parliament
solidifies independence and signifies that loyalty must lie with the legislature·and not
with the governing party.' As Canadian Alliance member John Reynolds said of the
Auditor General: "One thing I know about [them], they don't necessarily do what
ministers or the government tell them.,,8
Little has been written on the independence of Officers of Parliament. As
such, it is difficult to evaluate them. The assessment of independence is further
complicated by the many defmitions of independence that exist. For example, the
Law Reform Commission of Canada stated the following in their Report on
Independent Administrative Agencies:
For some observers 'independence' imports judicial
attitudes, and a commitment to process that courts display in
their quest for dispensing justice in individual cases ... For
other people, 'independence' implies the exclusion of
executive control over agencies, and of ministerial
responsibility to Parliament for the decision taken or policies
pursued in the exercise of their mandates. For most,
however, 'independence' implies a vague, shifting status that
defies any clear understanding of how agencies, as entities
that are not located within the central governmental
organization, should internct in legal sense with other
governmental institutions. Some are concerned that
agencies, exercising the broad control over public and private
6 Hugh Winsor, "Ramming terror bill into law could backfire," Globe and Mail, 29 November
2001, A14.
7 John J. Kelly and Hugh R. Hanson, Improving Accountability: Canada Public Accounts
Committee and Legislative Auditors (Ottawa: Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation, 1981),
77.
8 Daniel Leblanc, "Ottawa sends two reports by ad agency to auditors," Globe and Mail, 20
March 2002, A9.
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interests that Parliament gives them, may not be held
sufficiently accountable politically; others are concerned that
political interference with an 'independent' agency may
compromise its ability to reconcile those interests, and
contradict the very reasons that motivate resort to this
modeI.9
If there are so many definitions of independence, how can it be properly
assessed? For an answer to this question, one turns to R. MacGregor Dawson.
Although he wrote in the early 1920s (in his doctoral thesis, later published), his
argument is still relevant today. Dawson states that "the independent condition arises
when the political responsibility is abandoned or suspended,,,lo meaning there is no
political consequence for the actions of an individual. Dawson notes that there is no
independence in the absolute sense of the word. The key point surrounding
independence is whether the official has enough independence to complete
effectively and efficiently his or her task. I I The earlier example of Daniel Jacoby
illustrates a situation of inadequate independence since he was condemned for
criticizing ''the government's resistance to accepting a compensation package
proposed by the Ombudsman in 1997 for the so-called Duplessis Orphans.,,12 Mr.
Jacoby was also critical of new social initiatives introduced by the Bouchard
government, such as the "Ministry of Health plans to have poor people pay for
prescription drugS.,,13 These attacks by Mr. Jacoby should not be viewed as
9 Law Reform Commission ofCanada, Report on Independent Administrative Agencies: A
Framework for Decision Making (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission ofCanada, 1985), 7.
10 R. MacGregor Dawson, The Principle ofOfficial Independence (London: P.S. King and Son,
Ltd, 1922),4.
11 Ibid., 10.
12 Seguin, A6. The Duplessis orphans "were children born out ofwedlock in the 1940s and
19508 who were often mistreated after being wrongly interned in mental hospitals."
13 Ibid
malicious as such criticism of the government by an Officer of Parliament has
become common practice.14
Dawson argues that independence provides certain advantages, such as public
trust, that cannot always be gained through a political body. He cites the example of
judges, stating that "it cannot be denied that their independence as such gives them
no small amount of prestige. It is realised that the judges have nothing to lose by
doing what is right as well as nothing to gain by doing what is wrong.,,15
In addition, Dawson argues that independence breeds permanence which
brings with it a certain degree of specialization that cannot be assured when an
official is forced to leave with a change in government.16 Tenure, security ofoffice,
and removal procedures are important to the independence of an official. Tenure and
security ofoffice, for example, eliminate the fear of losing one's job over criticism of
the government. Furthermore, the removal procedure is also significant. Dawson
suggests that the more difficult the removal process, the greater the independence
granted to an individual because one does not have to fear losing one's job because
of disapproval over government action. I7 Consider, for instance, the difference
inherent in appointment at pleasure and appointment on good behaviour. The latter
requires a showing of 'cause' before removal and therefore contributes to the
independence ofan individual.
Salary is also an imperative factor in ensuring independence. If the salary is
set by government, the Officer becomes dependent "on the pleasure of the executive
for remuneration," allowing governments that are dissatisfied with the actions or
14 For one ofmany examples, see the "Groupaction Affair" where Auditor General Sheila
Fraser harshly accused senior public servants ofbreaking ''just about every rule in the book."
Andrew McIntosh and Jane Taber, "Auditor-General asks RCMP to probe federal contracts," National
Post 9 May 2002, AI.
15 Dawson, 11.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 17.
reports of Officers to penalize, or, as important, to threaten to penalize them through
salary adjustments. IS
Adding to the discussion of the independence of Officers of Parliament, the
Independent Review Committee on the Office of the Auditor General listed several
conditions it believed were necessary to ensure the independence of the Office of the
Auditor General, such as appropriate tenure and removal procedures. It defended the
independence of the Auditor General, which on occasion has been called into
question because appointment rests with the Governor-in-Council. According to the
Independent Review Committee, this does not compromise the independence of the
Auditor General. Indeed, it "is consistent with the manner of appointment used for
judges and others ofwhom independence is expected.,,19
Political scientist Denis Saint-Martin addresses independence in his
evaluation of the statutory relationship between the Officers of Parliament. He states
that the reporting procedure is important to the Officers' independence. While they
report to Parliament, they do not depend on Parliament for their authority because
statutes regulate the authority of Officers of Parliament.20 Saint-Martin argues that
independence requires that the Officers of Parliament must not be under the control
of the organization they investigate. In this case, that means that Officers of
Parliament should not be under the control of the executive. This independence is
protected by the Officers' reports to the House of Commons, their appointment and
removal procedures.21
18 Kelly and Hansen, 83.
19 Independent Committee of the Review ofthe Office ofthe Auditor General, Report ofthe
Independent Review COmmittee on the Office ofthe Auditor General ofC8Q@da(Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1975),92.
20 Denis Saint-Martin, "Should the Federal Ethics Counsellor Become an Independent Officer
ofParliament?" Paper prepared for the Conference "Independence and Responsibility: A Conference
on Officers ofParliament," Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November 2nd and 3M, 2001, 15.
21 Denis Saint-Martin, Building the New Managerialist State: Consultants and the Politics of
Public Sector Refonn in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000), 137.
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The above discussion outlines a number of criteria necessary to ensure the
independence of an Officer of Parliament; however, the challenge in the evaluation
of independence, as noted previously, is that no two Officers are alike. Therefore,
the test of independence cannot be uniform. Each Officer has characteristics specific
to his or her office that affect their independence, both positively and negatively.
In a court challenge to the independence of the Information Commissione~2
Justice Campbell of the Federal Court of Canada quoted Chief Justice Lamer of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Genereux and his interpretation of independence.
According to Chief Justice Lamer, the test for independence, for the purposes of
section 11 (d) of the Charter is
not [to] prove an actual lack of independence. Instead, the
test for this purpose is the same as the test for determining
whether a decision-maker is biased. The question is whether
an informed and reasonable person would perceive the
tribunal as independent ... It is, therefore, important that a
tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as
impartial, and that the test for independence should include
that perception.23
The importance of the perception of independence is evident as well during debates
in the House of Commons and the Senate over the appointment of Officers of
Parliament. For instance, there was opposition to the appointment of Bruce Phillips
as Privacy Commissioner (1991-2000). A former journalist for Southham News
(1957-1969) and Chief of the Ottawa Bureau for the CTV television network (1969-
1984), Phillips was also the Minister of Public Affairs in the Canadian Embassy in
Washington (1985-1987) as well as the Director of Communications in the Office of
22 Rowat V. Canada (Infonnation Commissioner) (2000), 193 F.T.R. I.
23 John Reid, "Round Table Remarks Prepared For A Conference on Independence and
Responsibility for Officers ofParliament," Paper presented at the conference "Independence and
Responsibility: A Conference on the Officers ofParliament," Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November 2
and 3, 2001, .ww!.y.infocOlll,g£&~, Retrieved 27 February 2002,4.
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the Prime Minister (1987-1990).24 Phillips was judged by some as being too close to
the governing Progressive Conservative Party. NDP member of Parliament, Svend
Robinson commented:
What we are saying is that in this appointment perception is
as important as reality, and that the perception of those
Canadians who are deeply concerned about the protection of
their privacy against attacks by the government and the
erosion of their privacy, is that a person who comes out of
the Prime Minister's Office and goes into that position is not
going to effectively stand up and defend his or her privacy.25
Returning to the Supreme Court of Canada and R. v. Genereux, Justice Lamer
also listed three conditions he viewed as essential to independence of the Officers.
These include security of tenure, a degree of financial security and "institutional
independence with regard to administrative matters, specifically those that relate to
the exercise of the tribunal or individual's judicial function," while acknowledging
that there will necessarily be some continued relationship between "decision-makers
and the Executive.,,26 This observation is essential because it recognizes that
complete independence, in the sense of detachment, is not possible and that the
appearance of independence is as important as actual independence itself.
Paul Thomas offers a set of criteria to help assess the independence of an
Officer of Parliament. It includes the terms of the mandate, the decisions
surrounding budget and staffing, and the ability of the agency to "identify issues for
study and whether it can compel the production of information.,,27 In light of the
24 Elizabeth Lumley, (ed), Canadian Who's Who 2001, vol 36 (Toronto: University ofToronto
Press, 2001), 1028.
2S Canada, House ofCommons, Debates, 7 June 1990, 12436.
26 Reid, 4.
27 Paul Thomas, "The Past, Present and Future ofOfficers ofParliament," Paper prepared for
the Conference "Independence and Responsibility: A Conference on Officers ofParliament,"
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November tid and 3rd, 2001, 21-22.
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foregoing, can it be said that Canada's Officers of Parliament are sufficiently
independent from government?
No single answer will do. Rather, individual examples of Parliamentary
officers must be examined. First, consider the Auditor General. Appointed by the
Governor-in-Council for a term of ten years, the Auditor General can be removed by
the Governor-in-Council on address of the Senate and House of Commons.28 The
salary of the Auditor General is equal to that of a puisne judge of the Supreme Court
of Canada.29 Although the Auditor General relies on government for his or her
appointment, other factors, including tenure, removal procedure and salary, ensure
the independence of the Auditor. Furthermore, the requirement of reporting to
Parliament through the Speaker of the House of Commons indicates that the Auditor
is answerable not to government but rather to Parliament. The Auditor General also
has the right to recruit his or her own staff and set the terms and conditions of their
employment, in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act (R.S.C. 1985,
c. P-33). Protected as to the conditions of work, the office of the Auditor General
also establishes its agenda and has the additional right to request information from
the government that may be integral to the proper management of the auditing
process.30 Another contributing factor to the Auditor's independence is the
professional qualifications of the individual chosen. Formal education and
experience help guarantee expertise in judgment and, therefore, confidence that the
government will not control the Auditor General.3!
28 Auditor General Act R.S.C., c.A-17, 1995, c. 43, s. 1, ~~Y}!.:9ag,.hyg~:SJ! retrieved 6
October 2001, section 3(1), 1-2.
29 Ibid., section 4(1), 2.
30 Office of the Auditor General, What We Do. www.Q£!g:QVg.gl~&g retrieved 28 January 2002.
31 Ross A. Denham, "The Canadian Auditors General- What is their Role?" Canadian Public
Administration 17 (1974), 266; Kelly and Hanson, 78; Report ofthe Independent Review Committee
on the Office ofthe Auditor General ofCanada, 92.
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The major source of controversy surrounding the independence of the
Auditor General touches on the budget procedure. Since constitutional principle and
statutory law state that "spending must originate with the Crown (i.e., the cabinet)
governments have insisted on strict control over the expenditure budget process.,,32
Some critics say that this requirement most adversely affects the independence of the
Auditor General. Several suggestions have been made to rectify this situation. For
example, Paul Thomas notes that in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom
there is a degree of parliamentary involvement in setting the budgets for the national
audit offices.33 In New Zealand there is an Officers of Parliament Committee that
makes the final decision regarding funding for the Officers.34
Former Auditor General Denis Desautels (1991-2001) also favoured
following foreign models for improving budget allocation. In his fmal annual report
to Parliament, he suggested that removing the Treasury Board from the budget
decision-making process could strengthen the independence of the Auditor General.
He recommended the arrangement employed by the United Kingdom where an all-
party committee of members of Parliament sets the budget of the National Audit
Office.3s
The independence of the Commissioner of Official Languages is also
protected by appointment, salary, tenure, and removal procedures. The
Commissioner of Official Languages is appointed after approval of the appointment
by a resolution of the Senate and House of Commons. The term is seven years, with
the option of reappointment; removal is only possible by the Governor-in-Council on
32 Thomas, 27.
33 Ibid., 27-28.
34 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Dr. Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand Government
under MMP (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 224.
35 Maria Barrados and Jean Ste-Marie, "The Auditor General ofCanada: An Independent
Servant ofParliament," Paper prepared for the conference "Independence and Responsibility: A
Conference on the Officers ofParliament," Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November 2 and 3, 2001, 9.
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address of the Senate and House of Commons.36 The salary of the Commissioner of
Official Languages should be equal to that of a Federal Court Judge, other than the
Chief Justice or the Associate Chief Justice.37 Again, the independence from
government is illustrated by the reporting requirement to Parliament, rather than to
the executive.38 Budgets and staffing for the office of the Language Commissioner is
subject to regulations of the Treasury Board. Currently, the staff of the
Commissioner is part of the federal public service which means that "all collective
bargaining agreements entered into by [the] Office must be approved by the
Governor in Council.,,39 Because of this arrangement, the independence of the
Commissioner could be compromised as it may discourage criticisms of the
executive for fear of consequences, such as budgetary restraint.40 Again, the
recommendation of a Parliamentary Committee to oversee the budgets of the
Officers of Parliament has been suggested to strengthen the independence of this
office.41
The Governor-in-Council appoints the Information Commissioner after
approval of the appointment by a resolution of the House of Commons and Senate.42
The current Information Commissioner, John Reid (1998-present), was the first
Officer of Parliament to be reviewed by committees of the Senate and House of
Commons prior to a formal nomination from the government.43 Reid comments that
36 Official Languages Act R.S. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.),_""w\y.oc:.ol-coLgc.c~: retrieved 6 October
2001, section 49(1)(2)(3), 14.
37 Ibid., section 50(2), 14.
38 Ibid., section 66, 18.
39 Commissioner ofOfficial Languages Dyane Adam and Director, Special Investigations,
Investigations Branch, Gilbert Langelier, personal interview, 6 May 2002. See "Note des Synthese,"
2.
40 Ibid., 2.
41 Commissioner ofOfficial Languages Dyane Adam and Director Special Investigations,
Investigations Branch, Gilbert Langelier, personal interview, 6 May 1994.
42 Information Commissioner ofCanada, "Access to Information Act: R.S.C. 1985, c. A-I,
section 54(1)" in Access to Information Act: An Indexed Consolidation (Ottawa: Minister ofSupply
and services, 1994),84.
43 Thomas, 26.
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his appointment illustrates the demand for an independent Officer of Parliament. By
having the candidate reviewed and approved by both the Senate and the House of
Commons, the government guarantees that its appointee is a unanimous choice. The
adoption of this type of nomination and appointment process would help to eliminate
the possibility of disagreement between the government and Opposition over the
nomination of Officers of Parliament and would further strengthen the independence
and credibility ofOfficers ofParliament.
During the process that saw Reid appointed as Information Commissioner,
parliamentarians were not in favour of the government's frrst nominee, Mary
Gusella, "a long-time senior bureaucrat," as she was not seen as having enough
distance from the government.44 It is Reid's opinion that "this pre-appointment
scrutiny, a first for the House ofCommons and Senate, was a healthy development in
the appointment process for officers of Parliament" (which designation he limits, as
does this thesis, to the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, the
Commissioner of Official Languages, the Chief Electoral Officer, and the Auditor
General), and "seems eminently well-suited for officers ofParliament.',4S
The Information Commissioner holds office for seven years, is eligible for
reappointment at the expiration of his or her term, and may only be removed by the
Governor-in-Council on address of the Senate and House of Commons.46 Like the
Commissioner of Official Languages, the Information Commissioner is paid the
salary of a Federal Court judge who is neither a Chief Justice nor an Associate Chief
Justice.47
44 Information Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Report 1998-1999 (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1999), 2.
45 Ibid.,3.
46 "Access to Information Act," section 54(2),84.
47 Ibid., section 55(2), 85.
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The work of the Office of the Information Commissioner is generally
detennined by the public through the complaints process. However, the
Commissioner is able to initiate investigations if it appears that there is sufficient
evidence that an investigation is needed.48 The Infonnation Commissioner is free to
hire his or her own staff, as long as the hiring process and terms of employment
coincide with the Public Service Employment Act.49
Commissioner Reid notes that there are other aspects to the independence of
an Officer of Parliament. While it is necessary for an Officer to be independent of
government, it is also important for the Officer to maintain a degree of independence
from the complainants. It is Reid's view that "what keeps Information
Commissioners from becoming too pro-complainant is his or her need to convince,
not order, the government to do the right thing. No Commissioner can accomplish
the mission if he is perceived as biased in favour of complainants."so Former
Commissioner John Grace (1990-1998) agrees. He knew he had found the correct
formula for independence when he was "getting criticized from both sides.,,51
The budget of the Information Commissioner falls under the control of the
Department of Justice, a fact the Commissioner finds unpalatable because "it
undermines both [his] actual and apparent independence.,,52 The Commissioner's
attitude is understandable since the Minister of Justice is his adversary in any legal
action undertaken by the Information Commissioner. For instance, at the time of the
Annual Report of 1998-1999, the Justice Department was "party to litigation seeking
48 Ibid., section 30(3), 71.
49 Ibid., section 58, 88.
so Reid, ~~Round Table Remarks Prepared for a Conference on Independence and Responsibility
for Officers ofParliament,n 3.
Sl Ibid.
S2 Annual Report 1998-1999,3.
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to limit the scope of the commissioner's jurisdiction.,,53 Furthennore, the Minister of
Justice is the legal adviser to any department that finds itself under investigation by
the Infonnation Commissioner.54 In view of this apparent conflict of interest, the
Infonnation Commissioner believes that it is not appropriate for the Minister of
Justice to have control over the Commissioner's requests to the Treasury Board for
resources: "However careful the Minister may be not to interfere, as long as there is
the possibility of holding the Information Commissioner's resources to ransom, the
appearance of independence is undennined.,,55
During his time as Infonnation Commissioner John Grace shared these
concerns. He questioned whether it was wise for the government to decide upon the
level of funding for a servant of Parliament. While the fonner Commissioner
recognized that his office was not alone in being subject to cutbacks, he noted that no
one seemed aware of the special relationship the Commissioner had with Parliament.
He claimed "no one from the Treasury Board asks if Parliament's work can be
carried on effectively after an across-the-board cut. No one in government considers
the implications of budget decisions on the office's independence."s6 John Grace
observed that in Ontario, the budget of the Infonnation and Privacy Commissioner is
defended directly before a legislative committee, and he suggested this model might
be useful at the federal level.57
The Privacy Commissioner follows suit with the general "Commissioner"
model; that is, appointment after the approval of the appointment by resolution of the
S3 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
ss Ibid.
56 Information Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Report 1992-1993 (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1993), 12.
57 Ibid.
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Senate and House of Commons.58 There is uncertainty over whether it is convention
to have the nominee for Privacy Commissioner appear before a parliamentary
committee before the resolution is passed. This argument arose at the time of the
appointment offormer Privacy Commissioner Bruce Phillips.S9
Like the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner controls his
own staff in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act.60 Complaints to
the Office set the agenda; however, with sufficient evidence the Privacy
Commissioner may initiate the investigative process.61
With respect to the budget of the Privacy Commissioner, Phillips shared with
the Information Commissioner a common anxiety:
The budget is set as part of the Department of Justice
envelope. Thus my only avenue of budgetary appeal is to
ask the Minister of Justice (whose operations I may have to
investigate) to beggar her own program. This arrangement
sends all the wrong messages about the Office's
independence and makes the principals profoundly
uncomfortable.62
The fact that the government sets the budget of the Officers is problematic,
for it would appear that this arrangement might affect the independence of the
Officers of Parliament. Phillips tends to think that it does. Slashing the budget of an
Officer forces the Office to cut back in staff, thus making investigations of the
government difficult to pursue. Mr. Phillips bluntly states the nature of the problem:
"The credibility of my office and the investigative process depends to a significant
extent on the ability of my investigators to go on site where these complaints occur;
that is frequently out oftown.,,63
Privacy Act R.S. 1985, c. P-21 ~~:t)y..J2rivc()111.,g£~~1
Retrieved 6 October 2001 section 53(1), 15.
59 Thomas, 25.
60 PrivacY Act section 58, 17.
61 Ibid., section 29(3), 10.
62 Privacy Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Report 1997-1998 (Ottawa: Minister ofSupply
and Services, 1998), 10.
63 Canada, Senate, Debates. 18 February 1999,2642.
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Discontent can also be found in the Privacy Commissioner's annual reports.
The Commissioner continues to express unhappiness about the independence of his
office, which is compromised by the attachment of its budget to the Department of
Justice, whose operations may at some future date be the subject of an investigation
of the Privacy Commissioner.64
The Chief Electoral Officer is appointed by a resolution of the House of
Commons, holds tenure until age 65, and may be removed for cause by the Governor
General on address of the House of Commons and Senate.65 It would seem that the
Chief Electoral Officer has more independence from the executive than his fellow
Officers of Parliament since his appointment relies on a resolution of the House.
Cabinet does not playa formal role in the appointment process of the Chief Electoral
Officer.66 As a result, the appointments of the Chief Electoral Officer tend to be
uncontroversial. In fact, members from two Opposition parties seconded the
appointment of the current Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley.67 His salary
is equal to that of a judge of the Federal Court, other than the Chief Justice or the
Associate Chief Justice of that COurt.68 As with the other Officers, the independence
of the Chief Electoral Officer is furthered by his reporting procedure to Parliament,
rather than to government.
The staffof the Chief Electoral Officer is hired in compliance with the Public
Service Commission regulations with the exception of Returning Officers who are
appointed by the Governor-in-Council. Personnel at polling stations are appointed
Privacy Commissioner, Annual Rmort. 1997-98. 10.
Canada Elections Act 2000, c.9, www.el.ections.ca
Retrieved 6 October 2001, section 13(1)(2), 1.
66 Thomas, 25.
67 Louis Massicotte, "Refereeing the Political Process: The ChiefElectoral Officer ofCanada,"
Paper prepared for the Conference "Independence and Responsibility: A Conference on Officers of
Parliament," Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November 2nd and 3rd, 2001, 21-22.
68 Canada Elections Act section 15(2).
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from lists compiled by the political parties who finished first and second in the
constituency in the last election.69
The Chief Electoral Officer may be the only Officer who does not have
problems with the way his budget is assigned. Since it is not known in advance
when an election will be called, the Chief Electoral Office does not have a
predetermined budget. Although estimates are put forward each year, if an election
is called, the estimated budget ofthe ChiefElectoral Officer is disregarded.70
For the most part, Canada's Officers of Parliament are independent animals,
both in actuality and appearance. For the Information and Privacy Commissioners,
apprehension arises out of concern that their office appear independent and that it not
be compromised because of the current arrangement. Although the independence of
some Officers could be enhanced through different budget distributions, in general
the Officers do not seem to worry about excessive government interference.
As was mentioned earlier, independence can never be absolute. Officers of
Parliament gain their legitimacy through their independence from government but
their legitimacy also comes from the public's knowing that these Officers are not all-
powerful creatures. Officers of Parliament must be both independent from
government and accountable to Parliament. Although Parliament "may delegate its
authority to an agency to operate independently or semi-independently from direct
government control, [Parliament] cannot abrogate its responsibility."n
2.2 Accountability
The definitional problem that surrounds independence also surrounds
accountability: "Since the concept of accountability is multifaceted in meaning and
69 Maggy Mannard, Information Officer Elections Canada, personal telephone interview, 4
March 2002.
70 Ibid.
71 Audrey D. Doerr, The Machinery ofGovernment in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1981), 106-
107.
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often difficult to discern in practice, a comprehensive and universally accepted
defmition has yet to emerge."n The second problem surrounding accountability, as
with independence, is that the literature on accountability is generally mute on these
issues regarding Officers ofParliament.
Accountability has been defmed as "that quality of a system that obliges the
participants to pay attention to their respective assigned and accepted
responsibilities, ... Thus, the likelihood that agreed goals and objectives would be
attained is enhanced."73 The Independent Review Committee on the Office of the
Auditor General explained, "accountability in its simplest terms [as] the obligation to
answer for a responsibility that has been conferred. It presUIiles the existence of at
least two parties: one who allocates responsibility and one who accepts it with the
undertaking to report upon the manner in which it has been discharged.,,74
By these definitions, Officers of Parliament are accountable through the
reporting procedure which accomplishes two things. First, it provides a report to
Parliament about the investigations of the Officer and how government departments
perform. Second, it provides a way ofcommunicating with Parliament by explaining
what the Officer has accomplished in the PaSt year. Besides reporting procedures,
Officers of Parliament are held accountable in other ways. One not immediately
obvious is that each Officer of Parliament is held accountable to the other Officers of
Parliament. Each Officer is free to ensure that their respective statutory obligations
with respect to fmancial management, language, information and privacy are adhered
to. Furthermore, each Officer is expected to go before a committee of Parliament.
72 Paul Thomas, "The Changing Nature ofAccountability," in Taking Stock: Assessing Public
Sector Reforms eds. B.Guy Peters and Donald 1. Savoie (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1998),351.
73 Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability Final Report, (Ottawa:
Minister ofSupply and Services Canada 1979), 10. Emphasis in original.
74 Independent Review Committee on the Office ofthe Auditor General, 9.
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Again, the Treasury Board audits the Auditor General each fiscal year.
Currently fifteen parliamentary committees discuss the reports of the Auditor
General, while the annual spending estimates of the Auditor General are brought
before Parliament. Moreover, the Public Accounts Committee can calIon the
Auditor General to explain spending and management practices of the Office. The
scrutiny of the Office of the Auditor General by these committees serves to "promote
accountability, good management practices, and sustainable development.,,75
Additionally, it also helps to bring attention, awareness and understanding to the
issues facing the Office.76 The Public Service Commission guarantees the Auditor's
obedience with the Public Service Employment Act.77
The Commissioner of Official Languages also sees his or her report go before
a parliamentary committee. After presentation to the Speakers of the House of
Commons and of the Senate, the annual report is placed before the Standing Joint
Committee on Official Languages. This Committee has been known to call the
Commissioner before it, which "reproduces in brief the ongoing dialogue about
language policy and administration that occurs in the larger society, and, in tandem,
the critiques of the Commissioner's role that arise from those various
perspectives.,,78
Appearing before a Senate Committee of the Whole, former Privacy
Commissioner Bruce Phillips explained his independence from government and
accountability to Parliament. He stated:
7S Office ofthe Auditor General, Perfonnance Report for the period ending March 31, 2001
(Ottawa: Minister ofPublic Works and Government Services, 2001), 9
76 Ibid.
77 Office ofthe Auditor General, What We Do.
78 C. Michael MacMillan, "Ombudsman or Active Conscience?: The Commissioner ofOfficial
Languages as an Agent ofChange," Paper prepared for the Conference "Independence and
Responsibility: A Conference on the Officers ofParliament," Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November
2nd and 3M, 2001, 11.
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The process of appointment . .. and the process of
accountability by which I report only to the Speakers and to
the members of both Houses is to make absolutely sure that
there can be no perceived or actual conflict of interest in the
operation of my office. I am not subject to a direction by any
department of government. That is the principal difference
between what I do and what, say, a deputy minister in a line
department does. He is under the control of the minister and
the executive of the day; I am not. I am under your control.79
Sometimes the mechanisms of accountability are weakened when they are
neglected by Parliament. This is the case with the Privacy Commissioner. Former
Commissioner Phillips stated that while he was a parliamentary Officer, Parliament
"[made] only occasional and cursory examination of the issues and our operations.',so
He also stated that "this is the first time I have been called to appear before a
Committee of the Whole of either house.,,81 It should be noted that section 75(1) of
the Privacy Act provides for a review of the Privacy Act by a committee of either
House although these reviews rarely occur. The annual report of the Commissioner
was examined in 1987, five years after the implementation of the Act. As of 1999 a
revision of the Privacy Commissioner's annual report had not since occurred.82 If
accountability is to be equally important to independence then this neglect is a
significant problem. In this case, Parliament's failure to maintain the accountability
of Officers of Parliament may be as serious as actual interference with the operation
of a given office.
Information Commissioner John Reid explains that the accountability of his
Office is a problem since the oversight committee neglects to take up his report. He
claims that the "Justice Committee, which has oversight responsibility of the Office
is one of the busiest H[ouse1of C[ommons] Committees. It does not have the time
79
80
81
82
Canada, Senate, Debates, 18 February 1999, 2645.
Privacy Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Re.port 1997-1998,9-10.
Canada, Senate, Debates. 17 February 1999, 2637.
Ibid., 2642.
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and energy to examine either the issues with which I am faced and which are
described in my Annual Report nor does it have time and energy to deal with the
fmancial state of the office.,,83 He adds that he is uncomfortable that his Office is
accountable "to the authority under which we act.,,84 Commissioner Reid remarks
that in addition to arrangements that could affect his independence, he also dislikes
the fact that the neglect ofhis office affects his accountability.85
Accountability, like independence, is a relationship. As such, when
evaluating accountability it is necessary to ask such crucial questions as who, what,
when, where and how? 86 The short answer is that Officers are accountable to
Parliament for their actions through their reporting procedures. The consequence of
poor behaviour is removal from Office. In some instances, the Officers of
Parliament have been criticized for their lack of accountability.S? However,
Commissioner Reid takes another tack- on the part of Parliament whose committees
fail to acknowledge the reports of the Officers.
The independence of Officers of Parliament is important because it creates
public trust. This is essential since the Officers exist to hold government
accountable. Without ample independence from government, it is unlikely that
Officers of Parliament would be taken seriously as "watchdogs of Parliament"
Independence allows the Officers to depict themselves as servants of Parliament and
not servants of government.
83 John Reid, personal e-mail communication sent Tuesday 19 February 2002.
84 Ibid.
8S Ibid.
86 Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical
Perspectives, 2nd Edition (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 142.
87 See for example, Sharon Sutherland, "The Office ofthe Auditor General ofCanada:
Watching the Watchdog" in How Ottawa Spends Your Tax Dollars: Federal Priorities 1981 ed. Bruce
Doom (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company), 219. The flavour ofProfessor Sutherland's argument
is indicated by the following quotation: "The Office ofthe Auditor General itselfneeds the medication
it has been offering the bureaucracy: some degree ofaccountability enforced from outside the agency,
and some element ofself-restraint."
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Several criteria help to ensure this condition. Tenure, salary, removal and
reporting procedures are all important aspects of the independence of an Officer of
Parliament. Also notable is the influence Officers have in setting their own mandate
and hiring their own staff. Another significant dimension of independence is its
appearance. Although there may be some problems with the way the budget of the
Information Commissioner or the Auditor General is set, still there is no question
that the Officers are independent. The ability of the Information Commissioner to
criticize the government for the arrangement of his office under the Justice envelope
indicates that there is a satisfactory degree of independence. The independence of
Officers of Parliament, however, would be strengthened if their budgets were
assigned by a committee ofParliament, rather than by government.
Accountability is essential because it guarantees the legitimacy of the
Officers of Parliament. While it is necessary that these Officers be independent from
government, there must be reassurance too that their power is not absolute.
Accountability is achieved through annual reports to Parliament, a procedure that
would be strengthened if Parliament reviewed these reports consistently. Indeed,
there are areas where both the independence and the accountability of Officers of
Parliament might be strengthened. Nevertheless, it is most important to recognize
that these concepts, imperfectly realized, shape the role and function of Officers of
Parliament.
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Chapter Three: Relationship with a Bicameral Parliament
The role of the Senate in the Canadian parliamentary system is often
overlooked or misunderstood by the public. Regardless of the public's perception of
the legitimacy of the Senate, it is almost constitutionally equal in stature to the House
of Commons. The only difference is that the House of Commons can initiate money
bills and the Senate cannot. Therefore, when studying the Officers of Parliament it is
important to remember that these Officers- the Auditor General, the Chief Electoral
Officer and the Commissioners of Language, Information and Privacy- have
relationships with both the Senate and the House of Commons. This is reflected for
example, in the procedure for removing Officers of Parliament. Removal of an
Officer is not permitted without an address from both the Senate and the House of
Commons.
Although these five Officers all have statutory relationships with the Houses
of Parliament, their individual relationships with each House differ. While the three
Commissioners are required to report to both the House of Commons and the Senate
through the Speakers ofeach House, the Auditor General and ChiefElectoral Officer
are required to report only to the House of Commons (through the Speaker), and not
to the Senate. An examination of the relationship between Officers of Parliament
and both the Senate and the House of Commons reveals much about the role of each
House of Parliament, as well as about the function and perception ofthe Senate. The
way an Officer is appointed, or the controversy surrounding the nomination of an
individual for a position as an Officer of Parliament, exposes the dynamics of each
House and the role that each plays in Canadian governance.
45
While there are five Officers of Parliament, this chapter will deal almost
exclusively with the Auditor General, the Infonnation Commissioner and the Privacy
Commissioner. Although in each instance the appointment and reporting procedures
of the Auditor General and Chief Electoral Officer exclude the Senate, the Chief
Electoral Officer has little reason to interact with the Upper House since it is not an
elected body. By contrast, the Auditor General deals with the finances of the nation.
While the Senate is unable to initiate as money bills, the subject of the nation's
finances still falls within the jurisdiction of the Senate. Although the Senate still has
a role to play in election related issues such as redistribution,1 the subject of elections
does not attract the same level of consistent attention as the problems associated with
finances, access to infonnation and the protection ofpersonal privacy.
The Commissioner of Official Languages has a unique relationship with
Parliament, as this Officer is the only one whose report is examined by a joint
committee of the two Houses. As with elections, the subject of language seems to
attract less controversy than the work of the other Officers.
Evaluating the commonalities and the differences of each Officer to each of
the Houses is difficult because of the distinctive features of each Officer. Like the
reporting and removal procedures, the appointment of the three Commissioners is the
same: the Governor-in-Council appoints each after approval of the appointment by
the House of Commons and the Senate. Although these actions are conducted in the
same way for the three this does not mean that the relationship between the
Commissioners and both Houses of Parliament is similar. It is the character, as much
as the procedure, that helps to shape the rapport with both the House of Commons
and the Senate.
See for example the debate surrounding the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Suspension
Bill, 1994.
Canada, Senate, Debates 11 May 1994, 439-441.
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The nature of each Office is key to determining the relationship with the
chambers of the bicameral Parliament. The role of each Commissioner, for example,
is to act as an ombudsperson dealing with complaints in the areas of language,
information and privacy. Even here there is difference: the Information and Privacy
Commissioners have a more controversial role than the Commissioner of Official
Languages. The Commissioner of Official Languages works to ensure that the
government, the public service and services under the jurisdiction of the federal
government comply with the Official Languages Act. In addition, the Commissioner
works closely with each House in the matter of language-related issues and
legislation through participation with the Standing Joint Committee on Official
Languages. Few people are particularly sensitive to language issues. Therefore, the
role of the Official Languages Commissioner tends to be less controversial than the
Information and Privacy Commissioners.
In contrast, information and privacy can be highly contentious subjects. As
such, the association of the Commissioners with Parliament, specifically the Senate,
differs. For example, while the statutory appointment route is consistent among the
three Commissioners, the ''unofficial'' appointment process is not. Because of the
desire for open government and the access to information, and the determination of
people to hold onto their privacy, the appointments of the Information and Privacy
Commissioners are often more controversial than that of the Commissioner of
Official Languages.
As a way to ensure that candidates for Information and Privacy
Commissioners are acceptable individuals for the task, individuals nominated for the
positions appear before a Senate committee prior to the Senate's offering its
47
approval.2 This practice is a way for the Senate to exercise, or attempt to exercise, its
equality with the House of Commons. These reviews became practice because, as
Senator Ernest Manning explained, the Senate feared being "asked to ratify the
appointment of someone we do not know at all; we [would] have no knowledge of
his qualification, his background or anything else. [It] ... simply turns the Senate
into a rubber stamp.,,3 Senator Charles McElman asserted that by calling the
nominees before a committee of the Senate, it shows that "we can then act as we
should act in this chamber, as people who take our responsibilities seriously.''''
Through these reviews the Senators emphasize that they are not servants of
the government. In addition, the Senate wished to illustrate, contrary to what is often
portrayed, that they are parliamentarians who appreciate the significance of their
roles as parliamentarians. Moreover, these reviews ensure that the individual
selected for a position as an Officer of Parliament is an appropriate person for the
task.
The appointment of former Privacy Commissioner Bruce Phillips in 1991
offers an example of the kind of tension that can occur between the two Houses of
Parliament. The appointment of Mr. Phillips was contested by the Senate and the
Opposition in the House of Commons because of Mr. Phillips' close personal
relationship with the Conservative party and then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.
Phillips had been the Director of Communications in the Office of the Prime Minister
from 1987-1990. Prior to that he had played an active role in the 1980 election
campaign. NDP member Svend Robinson claimed that in the latter instance Mr.
Phillips "admitted that during that campaign he called a lot of reporters and did
2 Paul G. Thomas, "The Past, Present and Future ofOfficers ofParliament," Paper prepared
for the Conference "Independence and Responsibility: A Conference on Officers of Parliament,"
saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November 2nd and 3M, 2001, 26.
3 Canada, Senate, Debates, 26 May 1983, 5647.
4 Ibid.
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whatever he could to attempt to get them to write articles and columns that were
critical, such as hatchet jobs on John Turner."s
As a way of expressing its opposition, the Senate took nearly six months (a
considerable length of time) to approve the appointment. Part of the complaint arose
from the fact that the government had kept the Senate from adjournment in order to
push through the appointment of Mr. Phillips. Senator Royce Frith, Deputy Leader
of the Opposition, declared that the government had "resort[ed] to strong measures"
to keep the Senate in session. According to Senator Frith, "the Senate cleaned up all
of the government's business except the Financial Administration Act. The study of
the Financial Administration Act in the committee was to continue until the end of
the month." Senator Frith continued asking, "so what are we doing here?" He
concluded, "we are here for Mr. Bruce Phillips; that is what we are here for.',€) From
the point of view of members of the Upper House this extraordinary action presaged
the possibility of even stronger ties between the government and the new Privacy
Commissioner. Since Mr. Phillips would owe his position solely to the government,
it was not clear whether this Privacy Commissioner would be a "watchdog" for
Parliament or, in the words of Senator Ray Perrault, a "trained poodle" of the
government.7 The Senators worried that this would compromise the independence of
the Commissioner, who would be in debt to government for his appointment. As a
result, the Senate and the Commons Opposition feared that he would not criticize his
friends in government.
The controversy surrounding this appointment says much about the role of
the Senate and the House of Commons. It illustrates the power of the government,
due mainly to party discipline and responsible government. The resistance of the
S
6
7
Canada, House ofCommoos, Debates 7 June 1990, 12436.
Canada, Senate, Debates 16 April 1991, 5625.
Ibid., 5626.
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Senators to approve the appointment illustrates the determination of the Upper House
not simply to pass the government's wishes. Although the appointment was
eventually endorsed, the Senators showed through the process of delayS that they
disagreed with the government's decision.
The Senators expressed their concerns that the appointment of Mr. Phillips
could set a precedent in which the prime minister would disregard the Upper House
and do whatever he wanted.9 The prime minister had ignored a political convention
that all parties agree on the nominee for the position of Privacy Commissioner. to
Refusing to rush to support the appointment of Mr. Phillips was one way for the
Senate to exercise a form of power, which was to refuse to be disregarded by a
government-controlled House ofCommons.
The Senators feared that this appointment would have several other
consequences that could weaken the power of the Senate. In addition to being in
disagreement with the strong partisan ties of Mr. Phillips, the Senate also objected to
the appointment because neither the Senate nor the Opposition in the House of
Commons had been consulted. According to political scientist Paul Thomas, the
precedent was to recommend a candidate that "commanded as wide respect as
possible.,,11 There was anxiety that if the government appointed one Officer of
Parliament without consulting the Houses of Parliament, then the trend would grow.
8 The members ofthe Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs were
accused by Honourable Senator Lowell Murray of "refusing" to report on their decision to decide on
the proposed appointment ofMr. Phillips. Ifthe committee refused to report, it was assumed that "the
resolution would die at prorogation and the government would have to retrace its steps in the House of
Commons and would have to start all over again." To this it, Honourable Senator Royce Frith replied,
"and do it right this time."
Canada, Senate, Debates 15 April 1991, 5614.
9 Canada, Senate, Debates 16 April 1991, 5626.
10 Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs,
25 March 1991, 30:6.
11 Ibid., 30:10.
As a result, government would continue to push through appointments ofthe Officers
of Parliament, notwithstanding opposition in the House or in the Senate.
Appearing before the Senate's Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs, Paul Thomas explains that the Senate's approval of an individual nominated
for a position as an Officer of Parliament is an important part of the independence
and legitimacy ofOfficers ofParliament. He states:
It is a generally-shared value within the parliamentary
system for these officers that they have widespread respect
across all party lines in the House of Commons and the
Senate. I do not think that the drafters of the legislation
intended that a whipped up majority in the House of
Commons, followed by an automatic consent in the Senate,
would endow these officers with the kind of authority that
they need.12
The Senate's role is important in the appointment process because it acts as a
balance to the partisan House of Commons. The Senate is a place where decisions
made in the House of Commons are reviewed and evaluated, in theory, away from
strict party discipline. This idea is reflected in the Senators' concerns over the
"acceptability of appointments.,,13 In the case of the appointment of Bruce Phillips,
the problem was not with the qualifications of Mr. Phillips to act as Privacy
Commissioner but rather with the appropriateness and acceptability of his
nomination. No one doubted that he had the skills to act as Privacy Commissioner;
many questioned his close ties with the Conservative Party and resented the
government's nomination of a candidate without the consent of Parliament.
Although this debate occurred during a time when different parties controlled the
Senate and the House of Commons, it should not overshadow the Senate's concern
for the acceptability ofappointments ofOfficers ofParliament.
12
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Ibid., 30:12
Ibid., 30:13
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The methods of appointment and removal, and the reporting procedures of
the Officers of Parliament, are important features that mould the relationship
between the House of Commons and the Senate. The reporting procedure of the
Auditor General is a good example: this official is required to report only to the
House of Commons, although the report is usually tabled in the Senate as well. The
fact that the Auditor General is obliged to report only to the House of Commons has
been raised several times in the Senate.I4 The Senators maintain that the fact the
Auditor General is not legislated to report to them undermines the Senate as an equal
part of a bicameral Parliament. Regarding the legislation that dictates that the
Auditor General report only to the House ofCommons, the Honourable Gilas Molgat
had this to say:
That immediately drew my attention, and I assume that I will
be told that this is an anomaly in the act and that the act
states that the Auditor General must report to the House of
Commons. If it is an anomaly in the act, I think it is high
time that we corrected that anomaly. I see absolutely no
reason why the Auditor General in some way reports what
this house does to the House of Commons. We are not
subservient to that house, nor should we be in any way. If
that is to be the system, then we ought to insist that similar
reports on the House of Commons be made to this house. I
would suggest that the Internal Economy committee
investigate this matter, and it if is an anomaly in the act then
let us correct it. It is an improper arrangement. These are
two separate houses, each with its own constitutional
provisions; one is not subservient to the other. IS
When this issue was pursued in committee, the Senators were told by then
Auditor General Denis Desautels (1991-2000) that when the legislation regarding the
Auditor General was debated in 1977, the new legislation was adopted based on
14 The issue was fIrSt raised in the Senate by Senator William Benidickson in 1977 (canada,
Senate, Debates 11 July 1977, 1116-1117); again by Senator Jack Marshall in 1981 (Canada, Senate,
pebates 9 December 1981, 3433-3442); and by Honourable Gildas L. Molgat, Deputy Leader ofthe
Government in 1991 (Canada, Senate, Debates 16 December 1991,830).
15 Canada, Senate, Debates 16 December 1991, 830. Author's emphasis.
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"existing approaches and longstanding traditions that, in Canada at least, the Auditor
General reports to the House of Commons . . . [I]t is also the same tradition in the
U.K., where [the Auditor General's] counterpart reports to the House of
Commons.,,16
The report of the Auditor General is often submitted to the Senate at the same
time as it is deposited in the House ofCommons. As Senator Frith explains, the issue
concerns the fact that there is no "responsibility under the law" for the Auditor
General to report to the Senate.17 One role of the Senate as a part of Parliament "is
to act as a check on the government, as a body that the government must come to for
approval for its actions. Therefore it would fit nicely into that tradition and all those
principles if the reports were also made to the Senate.,,18
The concern surrounding this problem touches on two important principles.
First, the Senators do not like to have their role as Parliamentarians undermined.
Senators, "even though [they] are not elected, [they] do have some responsibility as
Parliamentarians.,,19 The second principle relates to the tension between the two
Houses of Parliament. As former Auditor General Mr. Desautels stated: "We took
the position, on some advice, that at this point in time, our 1993 report was addressed
to the House of Commons and the lock-up was for the House of Commons, its
members and representatives. I know that from time to time there are tensions
between the two Houses.,,20 According to the Senate, the fact that the Auditor
General is only statutorily required to report to the confidence chamber undermines
16
13:13.
17
18
19
20
Canada, Senate, Proceedings ofthe Standing Committee on National Finance 21 June 1994,
Ibid., 13:14.
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Ibid.
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its role as a House of Parliament and adds to the tension that exists between the
upper and lower Houses.
The above quotations, as well as the issue regarding the Auditor General's
reporting procedure, illustrate instances where the Senate feels as though it has taken
a back seat to the House of Commons. As a number of Senators note, the Auditor
General is a servant of Parliament, not just a servant of the House of Commons.
Therefore, the Senate should not have to remind the Auditor General, the House of
Commons, or itself that the Senate has legitimate reasons to oversee in the affairs of
the Auditor General. Furthermore, these examples of the Auditor General's
disregard of the Senate support the false supposition that the Senate is not equal to
the House ofCommons.
The relationship between the lower house and the Auditor General says much
about the differences between the upper and lower chambers. The House of
Commons tends to use the Auditor General as a political tool, whereas this practice is
far less common in the Senate. This supports the argument that the Senate is
removed, at least more so than the House of Commons, from partisan politics and
government control.
The custom of using the Auditor General as a political tool is not one that is
new. In the early part of the twentieth century, there were occasions where the
Opposition in the House of Commons attacked the government for the late delivery
of the Auditor General's annual reports.21 While much care is taken in pointing out
that the Auditor General is not an Officer of Government but an Officer of '1his
House,,,22 the Opposition has no problem blaming the tardiness of the Auditor's
21 For example see Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 14 February 1901,95-98; Canada,
House ofCommons, Debates 15 March 1921, 905-910.
22 For example see Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 11 June 1895,2409-2411; Canada,
House ofCommons, Debates 14 February 1901,98.
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reports on the government. One excuse the Opposition used was that it was the
responsibility of the government to ensure that Parliament had what it needed in
order to do its job properly.23 The Opposition also faulted the government for
members of government departments not completing reports on time, for the printer
not printing the report soon enough,24 and for the Auditor's office being
understaffed.25 In such instances, the government has maintained that because the
Auditor is independent of government, it has no control over when the reports are
delivered to the members of Parliament.
Although the accusations and concerns move beyond late reports, both sides
of the House of Commons continually view the Auditor General as a political
weapon. For instance, the government has found itself criticized for speaking out
against the Auditor General. In 1970, the government was challenged by Progressive
Conservative member Mr. Ged Baldwin, for allowing a confrontation with the
Auditor General Maxwell Henderson (1960-1973) on the roles and responsibilities of
the Auditor General to reach "acute, if not crisis, proportions.,,26 When challenged,
the government responded, ''there is no confrontation between the government and
the Auditor General.,,27 The Opposition challenged the government, claiming that if
they believed the Auditor General wrong about a position he had taken then they
should introduce Parliamentary motions for his removal. Furthermore, if the
government wished to confront the Auditor, then that should have been done before
the Public Accounts Committee, because "it is unforgivable that the government
should begin an attack on the Auditor General under the table to undermine and
23
24
2S
26
27
House ofCommons, Debates 14 February 1901,95-97.
Ibid, 95-97.
House ofCommons, Debates 15 March 1921, 910.
Canada, House ofCommoDS, Debates, 15 April 1970, 5889.
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harass an officer of this House whose functions are of most basic importance to this
country.,,28
A more recent example concerns the Auditor General's report of December
2001. In this instance, both the Opposition and the Government used the report of
the Auditor General as a way to gain political ground. While the Opposition enjoyed
bringing attention to government mismanagement, Lucienne Robillard, then
Treasury Board Minister, chose to cite the Auditor General's praise for "government
for implementing new program audit and evaluation policies in federal departments
and agencies.,,29
The Auditor General is not the only Officer of Parliament that is used by the
House of Commons as a political instrument. The Information and Privacy
Commissioners also fall into this category. The Opposition saw the October 2000
appointment of Privacy Commissioner George Radwanski (2000-present) as merely
a political appointment adding to "an inadequate process.,,30 According to NDP
member Bill Blaikie, "this [appointment] is another missed opportunity. As far as I
am concerned, this is another demonstration of the fact that the government and the
Liberal Party are a hopeless case when it comes to democratic reform or doing
anything that would enhance the perception and the power ofparliament.,,31
Again, the 2000 Annual Report of the Information Commissioner was used to
illustrate the government's "blatant contempt for the commissioner.,,32 Among the
accusations in the Information Commissioner's report were the following:
For its part, the Privy Council Office (PCO) decided to resist
and challenge almost all of the Commissioner's investigative
28 Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 21 April 1970, 6110.
29 Andrew McIntosh, "Ottawa grant programs still 'undennanaged'," National Post 5
December 200I, A7.
30 Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 28 September 2000,8769.
31 Ibid, 8769.
32 Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 17 October 2000, 9114.
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powers. To this end, officials of the PCO have ignored
orders for the production of records; failed to fully comply
with such orders, (in one case non-compliance persisted until
after two Federal Court judges had ordered PCO to
comply).33
These allegations by the Information Commissioner led Bloc Quebecois member
Michel Gauthier to label the Liberal government a dictatorship: "The first
requirement of a dictatorship is to control information and release only what it
wants.,,34
These examples suggest that Officers of Parliament are manipulated by the
House of CommonS for political reasons, whereas this is not usually the case in the
Senate. Although the Senate may express its unease about the appointment ofcertain
individuals because of their partisan ties, the Senate does not exploit Officers of
Parliament for political gain. As a non-elected body, there is little political gain to be
made. Here, at least, is one argument in favour ofan appointed institution.
While the House of Commons will use Officers of Parliament for political
gain, the Senate uses them as a way to gain information. The reason for the contrast
is that partisan politics are the currency of the Lower Chamber; Upper Chamber
members depend upon information for their influence. According to the Information
Commissioner, there are instances when the Commissioner will ask, or will be asked,
to appear before Committees of both Houses. In the case of the money laundering
bill (Bill C-22 Improving Proceeds of Crime Act),35 the Information Commissioner
Ibid.
Ibid., 9115.
"Bill C-22 proposes to bolster Canada's anti-laundering efforts by making it mandatory for
financial agencies to report information relating to certain types oftransactions. The information
would be sent to a central data-gathering and analysis body, the Financial Transactions Reporting and
Analysis Centre ofCanada As well, the bill would authorize the release of information to both
domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies, subject to restrictions set out in the bill and other
legislation (including the Privacy Act). A third major aim ofthe bill is to establish, in association with
Canada Customs and Revenue, a system ofreporting large cross-border transactions."
Royal Assent granted 29 June 2000 (2000, c.l7)
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asked to appear before both the Senate and the House of Commons. Mr. Reid
appeared before the Senate Committee but was told by the House of Commons that
there was no time for his presentation.36
The House of Commons has the opportunity to use the Officers for the
purposes of information, but rarely does. Both the Information and Privacy
Commissioners were unhappy with the failure of the House of Commons committees
to review the reports of the Commissioners.J7 Although the Senate does not ask the
Officers to appear before them as "a matter of course," they may ask an Officer to
appear before them on special issues.38
In addition to using Officers of Parliament for the purposes of information,
Senators have also noted that Officers of Parliament constitute a tool
Parliamentarians should use to enhance their role, which is increasingly constrained
by government. As Senator Noel Kinsella states,
Privacy is not simply delegated to an officer of Parliament
We are not absolved of our role as parliamentarians to
protect privacy. The commissioner is an officer of
Parliament and does not replace Parliament. We maintain
our responsibility and duty in the rromotion and protection
ofthe privacy rights ofCanadians.3
The examples illustrating how each House views and uses Officers of
Parliament denote a difference in function between the chambers. What keeps
reappearing throughout the examination of the relationship between the Officers and
the Houses of Parliament is a difference in how each House uses the Officers of
www.parl.gc.ca/commonfBills ls.asp?!ang=E&Ses=~6&Ses::::2&ls=::CJ2&source=l?ills HOlllie..
Government#BACKG ROUNDtx!
Retrieved 28 May 2002.
36 John Reid, personal e-mail commWlication sent Thursday 14 March 2002.
37 See Privacy Commissioner ofCanada, Annual Report 1997-1998 (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1998),9-10; Canada, Senate, Debates 17 February 1999,2637; John Reid,
~rsonal e-mail communication sent Tuesday 19 February 2002.
8 John Reid, personal e-mail communication sent Friday 8 March 2002.
39 Canada, House ofCommoDS, Debates 5 October 2000,2038.
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Parliament. Because of the nature of the job, each House performs different and
equally useful tasks. The Senate, because it is appointed, has the luxury of reviewing
legislation without having to consider how the consequences may influence their
success in the next election. Furthermore, the Senate, as a chamber of sober second
thought, has the obligation to take more time in examination of new legislation.
Because of the nature of the work conducted in the Senate, it has the time to do so.
The language used in the House of Commons regarding Officers of
Parliament indicates the perception members of Parliament and the government hold
of the Senate in Canada. For example, when discussing Officers of Parliament, the
Senate is often left out of the equation. On many occasions in the House of
Commons, it is emphasized that any particular Officer of Parliament is an Officer of
this House.4o Members of Parliament tend to ignore the role the Senate plays
regarding Officers of Parliament and exclude the Senate as a part of Parliament For
instance, as mentioned earlier, the Auditor General is only legislated to report to the
House of Commons. Often, members will make reference to the reports of the
Auditor General stating that he or she reports to Parliament, when this really is not
the case since the Auditor General reports only to the House ofCommons.41
It may be the case that the term Parliament is being used as a synonYm for the
House of Commons, which is a frequent occurrence in political and colloquial usage.
While this may appear to be an insignificant detail, it says much about the place of
the Senate, and of the House of Commons for that matter, in Canadian politics. By
using the term Parliament as a synonYm for the House of Commons, it indicates a
40 See for example, Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 11 June 1895, 2410; Canada, House
ofCommons, Debates 14 February 1901,98; Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 26 June 1920,
4265-4266; Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 4 June 1990, 12353; Canada, House of Commons,
Debates 25 March 1994,2810.
41 See for example, Canada, House ofCommons, Debates, 15 March 1921, 904; Canada, House
ofCommons, Debates 29 June 1977, 7199; Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 18 July 1988,
17688; Canada, House ofCommons, Debates 25 March 1994, 2810; Canada, House ofCommons,
Debates 13 June 1994,5188.
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dismissal of the Senate. The constant reference to the House of Commons as
Parliament leads to an incorrect association in the public mind and, even the minds of
parliamentarians, that only the House of Commons constitutes Parliament.
Moreover, it disregards the importance of the Senate in Canadian governance and
perpetuates the erroneous assumption that the Senate is inefficient and
inconsequential.
The Perception of what the Senate does and the actual function of the Senate
are not reflective of one another. As examples drawn from the Auditor General's
work demonstrate, there has been a historic disregard for the function and usefulness
of the Senate. The view that the Senate is simply a rubber stamp for the government
is a mistaken idea that keeps reappearing despite continuous attempts of the Senate to
show otherwise. The examination of the relationship between Officers of Parliament
and the Senate and Officers of Parliament and the House ofCommons reflects of the
roles, dynamics and perception of the Houses ofParliament.
For example, the Senate's objection to the appointment of Bruce Phillips as
Privacy Commissioner illustrates the independence the Senate has from the House of
Commons, and the desire the Senate has to not be seen as a rubber stamp of the
government. Although the appointment was eventually approved, the protest of the
Senators indicated their disdain for the government's candidate for Privacy
Commissioner and the government's indifference towards convention. It also
showed that if the government chooses not to play by the rules, there is little the
Members of Parliament in the House of Commons can do. The Senate, then, is left
to act as a check on government, a role that is not successfully undertaken by the
House ofCommons.
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The Senate also acts as a counterbalance to a very partisan and quite political
House of Commons. That is not to insinuate that there is no partisan politics in the
Senate, only that the Senate is less political, or political in a different way, than the
House of Commons. While the House of Commons maneuvers Officers of
Parliament to fit into their political attack on the other side, the Senate takes full
advantage ofthe way Officers of Parliament can be used for information.
Finally, the way the Houses of Parliament interact with the Officers of
Parliament serves to exemplify the misunderstood role of the Senate. Since the
creation of the Auditor General, the Senate has had to remind Parliament that it has a
legitimate role to play in issues dealing with the Auditor General, as the office is an
Officer of Parliament, meaning an office that deals with both the House of
Commons and the Senate. With the frequent exclusion of the Senate by the House of
Commons, its little wonder why the role and importance of the Senate has been
overlooked and
misconstrued.
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Conclusion
This thesis has shown the important role that Officers of Parliament play in
Canada's system of government. The discussion in chapter one regarding
responsible government argued that the theory of responsible government in the
traditional sense was no longer applicable to the modem Canadian parliamentary
system. Adaptations to the system had to be made if government was to continue to
claim to function responsibly. One modification governments made was the
introduction of Officers of Parliament. The creation of these independent servants
meant that Parliament was assisted in their role of keeping the government
accountable. Consequently, governments were able to claim they were accountable
and responsible by reference to the Officers' audit and investigative function. As
such, the independence of an Officer of Parliament has come to be one of the most
important features in determining who is and who is not an Officer of Parliament.
Without a significant degree of independence, Officers of Parliament would not be
taken seriously as watchdogs ofParliament.
The contributions of Officers of Parliament to the governing process in
Canada have been increasingly recognized by the Canadian public and the press.
Controversies surrounding the allocation of government contracts such as the
"Shawinigate" scandal in 2000-2001 and the Groupaction affair in 2002 have seen
Canada's Officers of Parliament step out of the shadows and into the public
spotlight. More proof that the involvement of Officers of Parliament in the Canadian
parliamentary system has been increasingly recognized was the suggestion from the
Senate following the events of September 11, 2001, that an Officer of Parliament
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should be appointed to oversee the implementation of the Anti-terrorism legislation.
Although the proposal was not adopted, it is important to note that an Officer of
Parliament was recommended as a way to ensure public trust and confidence in a
piece of legislation that made many Canadians fear unprecedented delegation of
power to the executive would lead to unacceptable abuse of power as well.
More important still is the talk surrounding the need for an independent ethics
commissioner. Following the failure by the Liberals to carry out their "Red Book"
promises to appoint an independent Ethics Counsellor, 1 renewed debate, occasioned
by unethical fundraising practices and the awarding of government contracts, has
raised demands for an independent ethics commissioner along the lines of the
traditional "five" Officers of Parliament. When the Prime Minister decided again
against making the Ethics Counsellor an independent Officer of Parliament in May
2002, Progressive Conservative leader Joe Clark emphasized the importance of
independent Officers of Parliament by stating that "the failure to have an
independent ethics commissioner undermines the credibility of all other ethics
initiatives." Referring to Jean Chretien's failure to make the Ethics Counsellor
independent from government, Clark asserted that the Prime Minister "can write the
rules till the cows come home, but as long as he controls the cop, the rules are
worthless.,,2
The concern Mr. Clark expressed over the lack of independence of the Ethics
Counsellor says much about Officers of Parliament. There is the idea that an
independent Officer of Parliament somehow makes the rules worth something and
AI.
2
A7.
Joel-Denis Bellavances "Liberals Defeat Their Own Policy," National Post 14 February 2001,
Andrew McIntosh, "Guide to Chretien's 8-point refonn plan," National Post 24 May 2002,
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assures Canadians that government is accountable and responsible. The credibility
ofOfficers ofParliament lies in this independence.
Although Officers of Parliament receive little attention from the public and
from the press, it is these bodies that people turn to when responsible government
stumbles. The creation of the five Officers of Parliament was a response to particular
problems in government. Whether it was poor financial management or the
disastrous execution of elections, it was an Officer of Parliament that was appointed
in order to assure Parliament, government, and the Canadian people that the same
mistake would not happen again. After a number of reports that outlined unethical
government activities, the attention of the press, the Opposition in the House of
Commons, and the Canadian people has once again turned to Officers of Parliament.
Praise for the Auditor General was heard in 2002 over her findings in the
Groupaction affair; and the argument surfaced that Canada should have an ethics
commissioner that belonged to Parliament and not to the Prime Minister.
Officers of Parliament have become a crucial aspect of responsible
government. The relationship between the Parliament and its Officers illustrates this.
The fierce debate concerning the appointment ofquestionable individuals for the task
of an Officer of Parliament shows the determination of Parliament to keep its
servants removed from government. The relationship between the Houses of
Parliament and the Officers illustrates the important contribution Officers of
Parliament make to the governing process. The five Officers assist the members in
their work by assuming ombudsman-like responsibilities for language, infonnation
and privacy. In addition, the Officers provide information to both Houses of
Parliament, although this bicameral function is sometimes ignored by the House of
Commons. Finally, Officers of Parliament assure both the governors and the
governed that there is an independent body assuring accountability in government.
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FEDERAL OFFICERS OF PARLIAMENT
APPENDIX A
Officers, Created Statute Appointment Removal Term Reporting Procedure Salary
Agencies
And
Commissions
Auditor 1878 Auditor General Act Governor in Council, Governor in Council 10 years. Not Reports through Paid a salary
General (R.S.C., c. A- 17) by Commission on address of the eligible for Annual Report ofa puisne judge
under the Great Seal. House of Commons reappointment. submitted to the of the Supreme
Section 3(1) of the and the Senate. Mandatory Speaker of the Court ofCanada.
Auditor General Act Section 3(1) ofthe Retirement 65. House of Commons. Section 4(1) of the
Auditor General Act. Section 3(2)(3) Section 7(3) of the Auditor General Act.
of the Auditor Auditor General Act.
General Act.
Chief 1920 Canada Elections Act By resolution ofthe For cause by the Undefined. Reports through Paid a salary equal
Electoral (2000, c.9) House ofCommons. Governor General Mandatory the Speaker of the to the salary of a
Officer Section 13(I) of the on address of the retirement age House ofCommons. judge ofthe Federal
Elections Act. Senate and House 65. Section 534(1) and Court, other than the
ofCommons. Section 13(2) of 535 ofthe Elections Act. Chief Justice or the
Section 13(1) of the Elections Associate Chief
the Elections Act. Act. Justice
of that court.
Section 15(2) ofthe
Elections Act.
~
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APPENDIX A
Officers, Created Statute Appointment Removal Term Reporting Procedure Salary
Agencies
And
Commissions
Official 1969 Official Languages Appointed by By the Governor in 7 years. Reports through Paid a salary equal
Languages Act. Commission Council at any time On the the Speaker ofthe to the salary ofa
Commissioner (R.S. 1985, c.31 under the Great Seal on address ofthe expiration House ofCommons judge of the Federal
4th Supp) after Senate and the House of a fIrSt or any and through the Speaker Court.
approval of of Commons. subsequent tenn ofthe Senate. other than the Chief
appointment Section 49(2) of the ofoffice, is Section 69(1) Justice
by resolution ofthe Official Languages eligible ofthe Official or the Associate
Senate Act. to be re- Languages Act. Chief
and House of appointed Justice ofthat Court.
Commons. for a further Section 50(2) of
Section 49(1) of the tenn the Official
Official Languages not exceeding Languages Act.
Act. seven
years.
Section 49(2)(3)
ofthe Official
Languages Act.
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APPENDIX A
Officers, Created Statute Appointment Removal Term Reporting Procedure Salary
Agencies
And
Commissions
lnfonnation 1983. Access to Governor in Council By the Governor in 7 years. Reports through Paid a salary equal
Commissioner lnfonnation Act. under Council at any time On the the Speaker of the to the salary of a
(R.S.C. 1985, c.A-I) the Great Seal, after on address of the expiration Senate and through judge of the Federal
approval of the Senate and House ofa first or any the Speaker ofthe Court, other than the
appointment by ofCommons. subsequent tenn House ofCommons. Chief Justice or the
resolution Section 54(2) ofoffice, Section 40(I) Associate Chief
of the Senate and the of the Infonnation is eligible to be of the Infonnation Act. Justice
House ofCommons. Act. re-appointed for of that Court.
Section 54(I) ofthe a further tenn Section 55(2)
Infonnation Act. not of the Infonnation
exceeding seven Act.
years.
Section 54(3) of
the Infonnation
Act.
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FEDERAL OFFICERS OF PARLIAMENT
APPENDIX A
Officers, Created Statute Appointment Removal Term Reporting Procedure Salary
Agencies
And
Commissions
Privacy 1983. Privacy Act. Governor in Council, By the Governor 7 years. Reports through the Paid a salary
Commissioner (R.S. 1985, c.P-21) by Commission in Council at any On the Speaker of the Senate equal to the
under time on address of expiration and through the salary ofa judge
the Great Seal, after the Senate and House of a first or any Speaker ofthe ofthe Federal Court,
approval of the ofCommons. subsequent term House ofCommons. other than the Chief
appointment by Section 53(2) ofoffice, is Section 40(1) of Justice or the
resolution ofthe ofthe Privacy Act. eligible the Privacy Act. Associate Chief
Senate and House to be re- Justice of that Court.
ofCommons. appointed Section 54(2) of the
Section 53(1) of for a further Privacy Act.
the Privacy Act. term
not exceeding
seven
years.
Section 53(2)(3)
ofthe Privacy
Act.
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mSTORY
APPENDIXB
Auditors General of Canada
(Reverse chronological order)
Shelia Fraser 2001-Present
Shelia Fraser (Interim) 2001
Denis Desautels 1991-2001
Kenneth Dye 1981-1991
Michael Rayner (Interim) 1980-1981
James Macdonell 1973-1980
Andrew Maxwell Henderson 1960-1973
Robert Watson Sellar 1940-1959
Georges Gonthier 1924-1939
Edward Davenport Sutherland 1919-1923
John Fraser 1905-1919
John McDougall 1878-1905
ChiefElectoral Officers ofCanada
(Reverse chronological order)
Jean-Pierre Kingsley 1990-Present
Jean-Marc Hamel 1966-1990
Nelson Jules Castonguay 1949-1966
Jules Castonguay 1927-1949
Oliver Mowat Biggar 1920-1927
Commissioners of Official Languages
(Reverse chronological order)
Dyane Adam 1999-Present
Victor Goldbloom 1991-1999
D'Ilbervill Fortier 1984-1991
Maxwell Yalden 1977-1984
Keith Spicer 1970-1977
Information Commissioners
(Reverse chronological order)
John Reid 1998-present
John Grace 1990-1998
Inger Hansen 1983-1990
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Privacy Commissioners
(Reverse chronological order)
George Radwanski 2000-Present
Bruce Phillips 1991-2000
John Grace 1983-1990
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STATUTES
APPENDIXC
Access to Information Act R.S. 1985, c.A-I
Auditor General Act R.S.C. c.A-17, 1995, c. 43
Canada Elections Act 2000, c.9
Official Languages Act R.S. 1985, c.31 (4th Supp)
Privacy Act R.S. 1985, c.P-21
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